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Robert W. Adler*
Abstract
It is inevitable that the world will experience a significant amount of
global warming before efforts to mitigate the buildup of greenhouse
gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere can even begin to succeed. Therefore,
adaptation to climate change impacts, as well as mitigation, will be
necessary to deal with climate disruption. In designing climate change
adaptation efforts, a looming issue is how to balance the need and
compassionate impulse to provide financial and other relief to victims
of climate disruption impacts with the equally compelling need to
reduce the overall risk of those impacts. U.S. water, drought, and
agricultural law and policy provide a good example of how past disaster
relief efforts have sought to compensate drought victims or to insulate
them against the effects of drought, but in the process have encouraged
behavior that increases long-term risk and vulnerability. For example,
past and ongoing water and agricultural law and policy encourage
production of crops with high water demand and with inefficient
irrigation methods, even in arid regions, and fail to provide significant
incentives for sustainable water use.
In the long run, a more “compassionate” approach, particularly as a
strategy for climate change adaptation, is to implement systemic
policies to reduce vulnerability to drought and other climate-induced
disasters by increasing the sustainability of various economic sectors in
advance. For example, drought should be defined such that
governmental relief is available only for impacts that are beyond the
range of reasonable predictability; and drought relief should be
conditioned on actions to use water more sustainably, and thereby to
reduce drought vulnerability. Similarly, agricultural policy should
provide incentives to shift production, particularly of water-intensive
crops, to regions with increasing, rather than decreasing, water supply.
These efforts to balance compassion and risk will become increasingly
important as drought and other impacts of climate disruption become
more frequent and more severe.
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Law. I would like to thank Ariel Calmes, J.D. 2011, S.J. Quinney College of Law, my assistant
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INTRODUCTION
The prevailing consensus among climate scientists is that the world
is now “committed” to a significant amount of global warming before
efforts to reverse the buildup of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the
atmosphere can even begin to succeed.1 The magnitude, timing, and
distribution of expected warming remains uncertain and depends on
future political decisions about climate change mitigation, as well as the
inherent uncertainty in our ability to predict future climatic conditions,
given available modeling and assessment methods. Current model
projections, however, suggest that even the lowest projected levels of
warming will generate significant disruption in a wide range of physical
conditions around the globe and that the highest levels of warming
could cause human and environmental impacts of catastrophic
proportions, at least in many regions.2
Given these realities, it is increasingly clear that adaptation, as well
as mitigation, will be necessary to deal with climate disruption.3 In the
case of adaptation, a looming issue is how to balance the likely need
and compassionate impulse to provide financial and other relief to
victims of climate disruption impacts with the equally compelling need
to reduce the overall risk of those impacts. Those two goals, however,
are not always compatible or consistent.
Even absent climate change, disaster relief is often controversial if it
encourages behavior that increases long-term risk. For example,
compensating property owners in flood- or storm-prone regions may
encourage construction in those areas, thus increasing societal risk.4
1. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, ADAPTING TO THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 17 (2010)
(noting that impacts of climate change are already being felt in the United States and that future
impacts are unavoidable); see also V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous
Anthropogenic Interference with the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14,245–46 (2008) (estimating committed warming of 2.4°C even if
greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible
Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1709
(2009).
2. See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE COMPENDIUM
2009, at 8 (Catherine P. McMullen & Jason Jabbour eds., 2009) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE COMPENDIUM] (identifying inevitable commitment to ocean acidification, sea level rise,
glacier loss, changes in the hydrological cycle, ecosystem destruction, and species extinction
given current levels of change, and more severe effects absent effective and timely mitigation).
3. See generally Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dymanic
Water Management in the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 55, 56 (2008); J.B.
Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40
ENVTL. L. 363 (2010); A. Dan Tarlock, Now Think Again About Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 169 (1992); Matthew F. Zinn, Adapating to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a
Warmer World, 34 ECOL. L.Q. 61 (2007).
4. See James M. Wright & Don L. Porter, Floodplain Management and Natural Systems,
in WATER RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICY, PRACTICE AND
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Likewise, subsidized drought relief programs might encourage farmers
to engage in riskier agricultural practices—such as growing waterintensive crops in arid regions or using inefficient irrigation methods—
because the promise of public relief and subsidized water reduces or
eliminates incentives for farmers to internalize those risks in their
business decisions. As a result, drought relief policy might impede more
sustainable agricultural practices and policies, including policies
designed to match agricultural practices to local environmental
conditions. That perverse feedback can render the community even
more vulnerable to future drought.
This balance between compassion, risk allocation, and risk reduction
in disaster relief policy will become even more important if adverse
effects of climate disruption materialize as predicted.5 The
compassionate response will be to compensate victims for changes in
local conditions caused by global economic forces that are beyond their
control. If relief allows those victims to continue practices that render
them vulnerable, however, those policies will increase long-term risks.
Moreover, vulnerability increases with the frequency of the event,
decreasing the recovery interval between disasters.6 The result will
likely be a vicious cycle of relief and increased risk. Given the
likelihood of this scenario, perhaps a more “compassionate” approach is
to implement systemic policies to reduce vulnerability to climateinduced disasters by increasing the sustainability of various economic
sectors in advance.
Although the same analysis could be performed for other changes
expected due to climate disruption (such as sea level rise or increased
flooding), drought and agricultural policy provides one good model for
analysis of this concept. First, increased incidence and severity of
drought are among the most serious expected climate change impacts.7
EMERGING ISSUES 142, 143 (Martin Reuss ed., 1993) (noting that new floodplain development
continued after adoption of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)). The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) recently solicited public input on reforms to address ongoing
concerns with the NFIP. See Federal Emergency Management Agency: Public Meetings of
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Reform Effort, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,096, 69,096 (Nov.
10, 2010).
5. Although it is difficult to trace any given flood, drought, or other hydrological
phenomenon to global average changes in climate, some scientists suggest that climate
catastrophes are already increasing due to climate disruption. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Scientists
Perplexed by Weird Weather Patterns, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 23, 2011),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2014020916_weather24.html.
6. See infra Section I.B.
7. See, e.g., LUIS SANTOS PEREIRA ET AL., COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY: ADDRESSING
THE CHALLENGES 26–27 (2009); Syukuro Manabe et al., Simulated Long-Term Changes in River
Discharge and Soil Moisture Due to Global Warming, 49 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. 625, 626 (2004);
Guiling Wang, Agricultural Drought in a Future Climate: Results from Fifteen Global Climate
Models Participating in the IPCC Fourth Assessment, 25 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 739, 739–40
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Second, past drought relief policies have faced similar tensions in
balancing compassion and risk. As is true with respect to many kinds of
disasters, the modern governmental response to drought has been driven
by the desire to compensate victims for harm caused by unpredictable
changes in natural conditions through financial aid, free or subsidized
water, or relief from regulations or other legal requirements. Although
drought relief is the product of a range of political, economic, and other
factors,8 compassion is arguably one dominant motivating force. We do
not like to see people and their livelihoods suffer, especially for factors
that are beyond their control and for events that are relatively rare and
unpredictable. Moreover, when farmers—arguably the most frequent
victims of drought—bear the economic risk of uncertainty to produce
essential products, it seems equitable to distribute those risks across
society.
Another legitimate goal of drought policy, however, is long-term
risk reduction. For example, policies could be designed to promote
drought-resistant crops or crop varieties, encourage more efficient
irrigation methods, and encourage farmers to relocate from areas
expected to face increasing aridity to those likely to experience more
favorable conditions. Rather than devoting scarce financial and other
resources to reactive policies that are likely to increase long-term risks,
a sustainability-based approach to disaster prevention will reduce longterm vulnerability and potentially enhance the welfare of the
beneficiaries and society as a whole.
A disaster prevention strategy designed to reduce vulnerability to
drought may require changes to deep-rooted economic policies in the
agricultural and other sectors of the economy. At the most basic level, it
will require us to rethink what constitutes a “disaster,” as opposed to the
normal range of variability in weather and other conditions within
particular regions. This requires an initial inquiry into what is meant by
the term “drought.” Second, a prevention-oriented strategy requires us
to identify factors that tend to increase drought vulnerability and to
evaluate potential ways to reduce that vulnerability. Third, it will
require us to revise our philosophy regarding the range of conditions
that warrant subsidized public drought relief to protect farming and
other water-intensive activities, especially in areas that may no longer
be hospitable to those pursuits. In the United States, however, that shift
will also require us to reevaluate some of the core components of
national agricultural policy dating back to the New Deal. Thus, to
understand the effect of current laws and policies that have the greatest
impact on drought in the United States, we also need to explore the
(2005).
8. See infra Part I.
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history of, and rationale for, both drought law and policy and relevant
aspects of U.S. agricultural law and policy.
Part I of this Article provides the analytical framework for a
prevention-based or sustainability-based approach to drought mitigation
in a changing climate. First, it explores the nature and definition of
drought and examines how the conceptualization of drought affects
drought law and policy. Second, it evaluates conditions that increase
human vulnerability to drought and what might be done to reduce that
vulnerability. Part II critiques the history of U.S. water and drought law
and policy and related aspects of federal agricultural law and policy and
evaluates changes in U.S.9 law and policy that would promote more
sustainable water use and thereby reduce society’s vulnerability to
drought. Finally, this Article concludes with some preliminary
comments on the broader lessons that the preceding analysis might
suggest for adaptation strategies to address other impacts of climate
change.
I. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: FACTORS AFFECTING DROUGHT RISK
AND IMPACTS
Public policy toward drought response is shaped by perceptions
about the nature and frequency of drought and its impacts on various
economic sectors. Risk allocation decisions regarding drought have
significant implications for public and private investment. Those
decisions are based on a range of considerations, including the
perceived rarity and predictability of drought, the nature and value of
activities to be protected, and the fairness of concentrating drought risk
among a few individuals and businesses rather than distributing risks
across society. However, drought policy is also influenced by the nature
and location of activities affected by drought, and the vulnerability of
those activities to scarce water supplies and other conditions associated
with drought, such as heat spells and high winds. A more detailed
analysis of competing drought laws and policies, therefore, should
consider both the nature and definition of drought and factors that affect
drought vulnerability.
A. Impacts and Perceptions of Drought
Drought has plagued civilizations throughout history.10 Extreme
drought can cause severe economic and social dislocation, as in the
9. Although this Article focuses on U.S. law, the analysis also suggests lessons for other
parts of the world.
10. See WAYNE C. PALMER, Foreword to U.S. WEATHER BUR. RESEARCH PAPER NO. 45:
METEOROLOGICAL DROUGHT, at ii (1965) (“Drought has been cited as a scourge of mankind
since biblical times.”).
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Dust Bowl in the United States during the Great Depression,11 or
societal collapse,12 as some historians believe happened to the Sumerian
and Mayan civilizations.13 While not as immediate as hurricanes,
tornadoes, floods, or other hazards, drought often causes as much or
more human suffering and loss of life.14 Between 1900 and 2005, at
least ten million people died and two billion people were adversely
affected by drought and related famines; indeed, those statistics likely
underestimate human impacts.15 And as with other natural disasters, the
most severe burdens of drought (famine, malnutrition, disease, loss of
livelihood, and economic dislocation) often fall on those least able to
cope with them (the poor, women, children, and the elderly), due to
inadequate financial or material reserves or lack of other sources of food
or income.16
Climate disruption is likely to exacerbate drought impacts.
Climatologists predict significant shifts in global precipitation, with
11. See generally JOHN C. HOYT, DROUGHT OF 1936, WITH DISCUSSION ON THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF DROUGHT IN RELATION TO CLIMATE (1938) (discussing the major droughts
experienced by almost all of the states during the 1930–1934 period); VANCE JOHNSON,
HEAVEN’S TABLELAND, THE DUST BOWL STORY (1974); GREAT P LAINS COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE
OF THE GREAT PLAINS (1936) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS] (discussing the
migrations from the Great Plains Region resulting from the droughts of the 1930s); John Opie,
Moral Geography in High Plains History, 88 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 241, 250–51 (1998)
(describing the economic and socioeconomic effects of the Dust Bowl).
12. See THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES: HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT,
MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY 1 (2d ed. 2005) (“[P]oor water management brought a decline in the
health and well-being of citizens and, in extreme cases, even death to an entire civilization.”).
13. See EUGENE LINDEN, THE WINDS OF CHANGE: CLIMATE, WEATHER, AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIZATIONS 49–53, 69–73 (2006) (discussing the effects of drought on both
the Akkadian and Mayan civilizations); David Getches, Water Wrongs: Why Can’t We Get It
Right the First Time?, 34 ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2004) (noting that the fall of the Sumerian civilization
followed “environmental degradation from intensive irrigation”); G.H. Haug et al., Climate and
the Collapse of the Maya Civilization, 299 SCIENCE 1731, 1731–35 (2003). But see LINDEN,
supra, at 69, 151 (noting scientific disagreement on the causes of civilization collapse); M.J.
Ingram, G. Farmer & T.M.L. Wigley, Past Climates and Their Impact on Man: A Review, in
CLIMATE AND HISTORY: STUDIES IN PAST CLIMATES AND THEIR IMPACT ON MAN 3, 18–22
(T.M.L. Wigley et al. eds., 1981) (discussing factors favoring and disfavoring “climate
determinism” in human history).
14. See Heather Cooley, Floods and Droughts, in THE WORLD’S WATER 2006–2007: THE
BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 91, 95–96 (Peter H. Gleick ed., 2006).
15. See id. at 96–97 & n.4. These figures are probably significant underestimates due to
inadequate data and reporting, especially before the 1960s. Id. Available data are dominated by
a few catastrophic cases. For example, the 1941–1942 drought in China killed an estimated three
million people due to starvation, and the 1984 drought in Ethiopia likely caused a million
deaths. Id. Many less catastrophic episodes likely caused deaths and other severe impacts but are
less likely to have been recorded.
16. See JANET N. ABRAMOVITZ, UNNATURAL DISASTERS 23–27 (2001); Cooley, supra note
14, at 91–92 (discussing how droughts “in the poorest nations reinforce the cycle of poverty”);
see also infra Section I.B.
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some regions getting wetter and others drier.17 The United Nations
Environment Programme reports that these shifts will lead to persistent
drought and water scarcity in many areas of Africa, the Mediterranean,
the Middle East, Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, “southern and
eastern Australia, northern Mexico, and the southwestern United
States—a distribution similar to current water-stressed regions.”18 In the
United States, drought frequency and severity are expected to increase
markedly, not only in the Southwest, but also in other regions.19
Despite these serious past and predicted future impacts, however,
modern societies have developed a generally complacent attitude
toward drought. This complacency reflects a natural tendency to forget
bad times once they are over, at least until they return again. John
Steinbeck expressed that attitude famously in East of Eden: “And it
never failed that during the dry years people forgot about the rich years,
and during the wet years they lost all memory of the dry years. It was
always that way.”20 In economic terms: “[A]s a society, we tend to
place a high discount rate on the future when faced with a crisis.”21
Complacency occurs in part because drought is a “creeping”
phenomenon, the onset of which is gradual and therefore difficult to
identify until serious impacts have already occurred.22 As a result,
governments usually respond to drought on an emergency basis, and
measures developed in that atmosphere tend to be reactive rather than
preventive and proactive.23 Moreover, because even the most serious
17. See Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10–17 (2010).
18. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 38; see also Aiguo Dai,
Drought Under Global Warming: A Review, 2 ADVANCED REV. 45, 58–59 (2011) (reviewing
studies predicting increased aridity due to climate change in Africa, Southern Europe, the
Middle East, most of the Americas, Australia, and Southeast Asia).
19. See CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 38–39 (noting that “[i]t
will likely be only a matter of years before drought becomes the region’s new climatology” and
predicting that future droughts “will be worse than current extremes”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE
RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 42, 75, 83,
107–08, 112, 120, 123–24, 129–30 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009) (predicting more frequent
and more severe droughts).
20. JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 6 (2002); see also JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 288 (“It
was hard, when everybody was making money, to remember how fast men could go broke when
the rain quit.”).
21. PETER H. GLEICK & LINDA NASH, THE SOCIETAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF THE
CONTINUING CALIFORNIA DROUGHT 61 (Pac. Inst. For Studies in Dev., Env’t & Sec., 1991).
22. See Kelly T. Redmond, The Depiction of Drought: A Commentary, 2002 BULL. AM.
METEOROLOGICAL SOC. 1143, 1144 (“Like twilight, drought creeps stealthily into
existence . . . .”); Donald A. Wilhite & Michael H. Glantz, Understanding the Drought
Phenomenon: The Role of Definitions, 10 WATER INT’L 111, 111–12 (1985); see also
ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 16, at 16.
23. See INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, WORLD DISASTERS
REPORT 2009: FOCUS ON EARLY WARNING, EARLY ACTION 131–32 (2009) [hereinafter WORLD
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droughts inevitably give way to more favorable conditions, the public
and private sectors alike tend to fall prey to what drought experts have
called the “hydro-illogical” cycle. This phenomenon is characterized by
panic and ad hoc, reactive approaches in the face of serious drought,
followed by apathy and a return to past practices once the rains return.24
The creeping nature of drought generates a difficult policy tension in
determining when various policy responses to drought (such as relief
payments or water rationing) should begin. If drought relief is triggered
too readily, farmers might receive unintended windfalls and be
encouraged to engage in riskier practices in the future; but if relief
comes too late, the ability of farmers to recover from drought might be
impaired. More importantly, complacency and collective loss of
memory during “the rich times” can lead societies to pursue
unsustainable water and agricultural policies and practices. Those
policies and practices, in turn, render regions more vulnerable to the
effects of drought when dry weather returns. Avoiding this cycle
requires attention to the definition of drought.
B. Drought Definitions
Drought defies universal definition because it is a relative concept
that varies with location and economic, social, and political context.
However, the definition of drought can profoundly change the
implications of drought response policies. As two prominent drought
experts noted, “[D]rought, like beauty, is largely defined by the
beholder and how it may affect his or her activity or enterprise.”25 A
survey conducted in 1985 identified more than 150 published
definitions of drought in academic literature.26 The most basic and
universally accepted definitions compare supply to need—that is, in
general, drought is a deficiency in precipitation that leads to deficits in
water supply relative to human and environmental needs.27 Thus,
DISASTERS REPORT 2009]; NAT’L DROUGHT POLICY COMM’N, PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE
21ST CENTURY 1 (2000) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY]; Donald
A. Wilhite et al., Drought Preparedness Planning: Building Institutional Capacity, in DROUGHT
AND WATER CRISES: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 93, 94 (Donald A.
Wilhite ed., 2005).
24. See Wilhite et al., supra note 23, at 94–95.
25. Donald A. Wilhite & Margie Buchanan-Smith, Drought as Hazard: Understanding
the Natural and Social Context, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23, at 3, 6; see also
PALMER, supra note 10, at 1 (“Drought means various things to various people.”); Redmond,
supra note 22, at 1147 (“Drought is a many-headed creature, and its full description requires an
equally diverse menagerie of indices and indicators.”).
26. See Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 113–15; see also Michael J. Hayes, Types of
Drought, NATIONAL DROUGHT MITIGATION CENTER, available at http://drought.unl.edu/
DroughtBasics/TypesofDrought.aspx (evaluating drought indices).
27. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING
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drought has a physical component (deficiency in precipitation) and an
environmental, social, or economic component (need or demand).
Experts group drought definitions into four categories.28
“Meteorological drought” is a sustained reduction in precipitation over a
defined period of time relative to a defined baseline condition.29
“Agricultural drought” is a deficiency in soil moisture relative to crop or
forage needs,30 leading to reduced crop yield or quality or total crop
failures. “Hydrological drought” is a deficiency in water storage and
flow in natural or artificial systems, including reduced soil moisture,
groundwater depth, stream flow, runoff volume, and water levels in
lakes and reservoirs.31 “Socioeconomic drought” is a deficiency in
water relative to some economic need or resource, such as livestock
watering, irrigation, hydroelectric power generation, or municipal and
industrial use.32 The latter three categories might be grouped together as
“effects-based” drought definitions.
This system of categorization, however, does not deal with other
variables that further complicate policy responses to drought.
Precipitation, for example, varies relative to geography.33 Levels that
would be abundant in an arid region might set record lows in a normally
humid zone.34 Therefore, a legal drought definition that fails to account
for regional variation could result in perverse policy incentives or
DROUGHT: THE REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS 4 (1995) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY OF
WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT] (defining drought as “periods of time when natural or
managed water systems do not provide enough water to meet established human and
environmental uses because of natural shortfalls in precipitation or streamflow”); Cooley, supra
note 14, at 92 (defining drought as “a hydrological extreme caused by a persistent and abnormal
moisture deficiency that has adverse impacts on vegetation, animals, and people over a
relatively large area”); Wilhite & Buchanan-Smith, supra note 25, at 4 (defining drought as a
deficiency in precipitation relative to “expected” or “normal” conditions resulting in insufficient
water to meet human or environmental needs).
28. See Richard R. Heim, Jr., A Review of Twentieth-Century Drought Indices Used in the
United States, 2002 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC. 1149, 1149 (citing 1997 categorization
by the American Meteorological Society); Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 113; see also
PALMER, supra note 10, at 1–3.
29. See Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 113–14.
30. See id. at 114–15.
31. See id. at 115.
32. See id. at 115–16. Arguably, agricultural drought could be considered a subset of
socioeconomic drought, but it is distinguished by the direct physical relationship between
meteorological and other related climatic conditions (such as temperature and humidity) and
both soil moisture and plant needs.
33. See id. at 113.
34. As such, absolute measures of low precipitation (less than x inches per year) are suited
only to the specific climates for which they are derived. More relative approaches define
drought by reference to a percentage of “normal” or “average” precipitation within a region (less
than x% of average per unit of time), but suggest other difficulties. See id. at 113–14; Hayes,
supra note 26.
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socioeconomic impacts. A definition based on conditions in humid
areas might trigger drought relief too readily in an arid region, leading
to insufficient incentives to reduce drought risk through more
sustainable water policies. Conversely, a definition based on arid
conditions might lead to significant hardship in an area accustomed to
more abundant water supplies.
Even within a given region there is no such thing as “normal”
precipitation, due to significant natural variation.35 Historical data can
be used to calculate “average” precipitation within an area or to
characterize the statistical probability of different amounts of
precipitation within a defined region. However, there is no single
correct rule defining what variance from an established norm, and over
what period of time, is appropriate to characterize a deficiency as
meteorological drought.36 Does drought occur whenever precipitation
drops below “average,” or only when it deviates from the norm by a
specified amount, such as the lowest quartile of the normal range? Does
one month of such deviation suffice to declare a meteorological
drought, or is a longer period required? Scientific factors might
influence those decisions, but a policy judgment is necessary to
determine when drought relief or other governmental response is
justified; that choice will influence the degree to which the policy
promotes relief at the expense of risk reduction, or vice versa.
The definition of meteorological drought can also depend on the
length of the available historic record and the sources and reliability of
the information. Even longstanding historic records (of a century or
more) may not fully characterize the climate within a given region.37
For example, based on dendochronological research38 and other sources
35. See Michael J. Hayes, Comparison of Major Drought Indices: Introduction, NAT’L
DROUGHT MITIGATION CTR., available at http://drought.unl.edu/Planning/Monitoring/
ComparisonofIndicesIntro/PercentofNormal.aspx (noting that mean precipitation can vary from
the median because precipitation often does not reflect a normal probability distribution);
Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 114 (critiquing use of thirty-year regional mean as definition
of “normal” precipitation due to significant interannual variability).
36. See PALMER, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that all drought definitions reflect some
degree of arbitrariness); Heim, supra note 28, at 1150 (noting that no single index captures all
aspects of the drought phenomenon).
37. See Kevin Trenberth et al., Exploring Drought and Its Implications for the Future, 85
EOS 27, 27–29 (2004) (identifying “mega-droughts” based on paleoclimate analysis indicating
that “the full range of drought variability is potentially much larger than has been seen in the last
100 years”); Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 114 (noting that “[t]hirty years . . . represents
only a small part of the historical record for most locations and would not be representative of
the long-term climatic record”).
38. Scientists can correlate the width of annual tree ring growth with available moisture
and use that information to deduce the amount of runoff within a drainage basin over time, as far
back as tree rings are available. See, e.g., CHARLES W. STOCKTON & GORDON C. JACOBY, JR.,
LAKE POWELL RESEARCH PROJECT BULL. NO. 18: LONG-TERM SURFACE-WATER SUPPLY AND
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of information, the past century has been among the wettest in the
American West for at least the past millennium.39 Thus, if we use
“below normal” by reference to the past century to characterize drought,
and if conditions revert to “normal” as defined by the past millennium,
we can expect persistent “drought” conditions to occur in the future
even absent additional changes induced by climate disruption. That
interpretation could result in drought response virtually all of the time,
converting drought “relief” into a permanent subsidy for water use.
Even with these definitional complexities, the concept of
meteorological drought addresses only the supply side of the equation.
The remaining three categories of drought relate water supply to various
human needs as well as antecedent conditions. Meteorological drought
usually precedes agricultural, hydrological, or socioeconomic drought,
but not always; rather, these types of drought additionally depend on
prior conditions, either natural or artificial in origin.40 Agricultural
drought might not follow from meteorological drought if a preceding
wet period caused significant storage of soil moisture, or if crop water
needs decline due to cooler temperatures.41 Similarly, whether
meteorological drought leads to hydrological drought depends on
preceding water conditions and other factors.42 If a dry year follows a
wet period in which a lot of water has been stored in the system (soil,
aquifers, surface water, and reservoirs), physical impacts to natural or
human water resources may be small. However, even a moderately dry
year following a long period of incremental reduction in stored water
can have more significant hydrologic impacts. Other environmental
variables that affect the hydrologic effects of drought include
temperature and humidity, which affect evapo-transpiration rates as well
as precipitation timing and intensity (that is, snow versus rain or steady,
moderate rain versus infrequent downpours).43
More importantly, effects-based drought depends on the balance
between supply and demand, which reflects controllable artificial
factors and uncontrollable natural conditions.44 For example, we might
STREAMFLOW TRENDS IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 3, 4 (1976); Connie A. Woodhouse
et al., Updated Streamflow Reconstructions for the Upper Colorado River Basin, 42 WATER
RESOURCES RES. 1, 2 (2006).
39. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT:
EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 108–09 (2007); see also David
M. Meko et al., Medieval Drought in the Upper Colorado River Basin, 34 GEOPHYSICAL RES.
LETTERS 4 (2007).
40. See Heim, supra note 28, at 1149; Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 114–15.
41. Supra note 40.
42. See Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 115.
43. Supra note 40.
44. See Redmond, supra note 22, at 1144 (commenting that demand factor is more subject
to human manipulation).
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prevent or mitigate agricultural drought either by supplementing water
sources or by reducing water needs—by growing less water-intensive
crops or crop varieties, fallowing marginal lands, or using more
efficient irrigation methods.45 Likewise, municipal water demand can be
reduced through a wide variety of mechanisms, such as real cost and
accelerating block pricing, other financial incentives, mandatory
regulations, or rationing.46 Thus, water supplies that might seem
luxurious to low-demand communities might be considered a severe
socioeconomic drought in profligate ones. For effects-based drought
definitions that relate supply to demand, human behavior can “cause”
droughts through unsustainable land or water use.47 Drought definitions
that establish a low threshold for relief might relieve serious local or
regional impacts, but in ways that decrease incentives to reduce drought
risk and impacts through sustainable water use and management.
Effects-defined drought can occur more readily due to vulnerability, but
drought definitions and policies can also exacerbate vulnerability.
C. Vulnerability Assessment
Disaster assessment is a function of both the natural hazard itself (for
example, the probability that an earthquake of a certain magnitude will
occur) and the population’s vulnerability to the effects (such as the
ability of buildings to withstand an earthquake of a particular
strength).48 Overall risk reflects both the likelihood and potential
severity of a hazard and the vulnerability of the at-risk population.
Vulnerability is defined as “the characteristics of a person or group in
terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from
the impact of a natural hazard,”49 or more simply as “the potential for
loss.”50 Actual harm depends on both the likelihood and magnitude of
the hazard and the ability of various populations to withstand or respond
45. See COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY, supra note 7, at 270–316 (describing various
water conservation techniques).
46. See id. at 243–63; Amy Vickers, Managing Demand: Water Conservation as a
Drought Mitigation Tool, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISES, supra note 23, at 178–86.
47. See PALMER, supra note 10, at 3 (referring to the concept of man-made drought where
usage exceeds available water supply); Redmond, supra note 22, at 1144 (noting that population
growth can “turn a dry spell into a drought”); Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 116
(commenting that land use can create or exacerbate droughts, citing the Dust Bowl of the 1930s
and more recent droughts in Africa as examples).
48. See generally PIERS BLAIKIE ET AL., AT RISK: NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S
VULNERABILITY, AND DISASTERS 5 (1994) (analyzing vulnerability in terms of the “social,
economic, and political processes that influence how hazards affect people”).
49. Id. at 9.
50. Susan L. Cutter, Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards, 20, 4 PROGRESS IN HUMAN
GEOGRAPHY 529, 529 (1996); see also ADAPTING TO THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra
note 1, at 126–27.
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to its effects.51
Vulnerability is a function of geographic factors, such as where
people live relative to potential natural disasters (floodplains, seismic
risk zones), plus a range of less easily characterized but equally
important social, economic, and political factors. Those factors include
financial reserves and alternative sources of income when livelihoods
are disrupted, access to physical assets and resources to cope with and
to recover from hazards, distribution of wealth within a society or
economy, stability and security of legal and political rights, and
discrimination between population groups.52 Thus, although poverty is
one key factor in generating vulnerability, poverty alone neither
guarantees that particular individuals or groups will be vulnerable to
particular hazards, nor fully explains why.53
From a global perspective, it is critical to assess vulnerability to
drought induced by climate disruption. For people in developing
countries who already live a marginal existence, relatively small shifts
in the availability of water and other key resources will have drastic
adverse impacts on food security.54 Drought and ensuing famine often
either cause or coincide with armed conflict, and conflict significantly
exacerbates the effects of drought and famine.55 Experts predict that
higher temperatures and drought will cause a major food crisis in many
parts of the world over the next century.56 Those effects are likely to
produce a crisis of refugees and ensuing internal and external
conflicts.57
Even in the United States, scientists predict an increase in the
frequency, severity, and geographic extent of drought due to climate
disruption.58 And despite the comparatively large amount of financial,
technical, and other resources available to adapt to drought in the
United States, past U.S. drought responses suggest that improvements
are possible. If more severe and prolonged droughts occur in the United
51. See BLAIKIE ET AL., supra note 48, at 9.
52. See id. at 9–10; W. Neil Adger & P. Mick Kelly, Social Vulnerability to Climate
Change and the Architecture of Entitlements, 4 MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR
GLOBAL CHANGE 253, 258–60 (1999).
53. See Adger & Kelly, supra note 52, at 258.
54. See AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ET AL., POVERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: REDUCING
THE VULNERABILITY OF THE POOR THROUGH ADAPTATION (2003) [hereinafter POVERTY AND
CLIMATE CHANGE]; Hans G. Bohle et al., Climate Change and Social Vulnerability: Toward a
Sociology and Geography of Food Insecurity, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 37, 37 (1994).
55. See BLAIKIE ET AL., supra note 48, at 5, 24 (citing examples in Somalia, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Chad, Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique).
56. See David S. Battisti & Rosamond L. Naylor, Historical Warnings of Future Food
Insecurity with Unprecedented Seasonal Heat, 323 SCIENCE 240, 241 (2009).
57. See Ben Wisner et al., Climate Change and Human Security, RADIXONLINE,
http://www.radixonline.org/cchs.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
58. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 19.
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States due to climate disruption, the choice between relief-based
responses and vulnerability-reducing strategies will become even more
difficult but even more important.
While poverty is the main source of vulnerability in the developing
world, inefficiency may be the most significant culprit in the developed
world. In countries with access to sufficient capital and engineering
expertise, the traditional approach to imbalances between supply and
demand has been to increase water storage or supply.59 Therefore,
regions with high water demand, such as agricultural areas that depend
on irrigation, experience more serious impacts from a given shortage
than areas with lower water needs. Likewise, growing cities that fail to
curb per capita water use or to reduce leaks and other sources of
inefficiency in their storage and delivery systems will be more
vulnerable to drought than more efficient regions. Of course, efficiency
improvements will only decrease vulnerability if the “saved” water
really functions as a reserve to guard against future drought, and not to
fuel additional growth.60 Moreover, government investments, subsidies,
and other incentives can promote excess water use and development in
drought-prone regions in ways that increase vulnerability. A comparison
of responses to two historically significant droughts highlights these
issues.
1. The Dust Bowl Experience in the Great Plains
The history of farming and ranching in the Great Plains exemplifies
the boom-and-bust cycles and patterns of complacency61 that can
increase vulnerability even in wealthy and resilient societies. The Great
Plains has been vulnerable to devastating boom-and-bust cycles over the
past 150 years, and the downturns usually coincided with severe
drought.62 Aided by U.S. government land policies designed to promote
westward expansion, and encouraged by railroad companies, land
speculators, and newspapers formed largely to promote those interests,
59. See COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY, supra note 7, at 101 (arguing that “[m]ost water
supply schemes need to incorporate reservoirs”). See generally WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS,
DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT, A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING (2000).
60. Some argue that inefficiency is a useful buffer against drought because efficiency
improvements can be tapped when needed during a drought. See NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER
MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at 20. Except for simple rationing programs,
however, which can be disruptive, water efficiency improvements often require time and money
to implement and cannot simply be turned on or off when drought hits.
61. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
62. See generally THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT P LAINS, supra note 11 (describing various
droughts suffered in the Great Plains); JOHNSON, supra note 11; DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note
11; Opie, supra note 11; Deborah Epstein Popper & Frank J. Popper, The Great Plains: From
Dust to Dust, PLANNING (Dec. 1987), at 12; William E. Riebsame, Sustainability of the Great
Plains in an Uncertain Climate, 1 GREAT PLAINS RES. 133 (1991).
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settlers from the East flocked to the Great Plains during the late 1800s
and early 1900s.63 Those migrants were lured by the promise of
economic self-sufficiency, cheap and fertile land, and favorable
weather. However, they brought farming practices and assumptions
about weather rooted in the cultural knowledge of Europe and the
eastern United States, but that ultimately were unsustainable in the very
different and highly variable climate of the Great Plains.64
Farmers and ranchers in the Great Plains fell victim to the “hydroillogical” cycle.65 Settlers overstocked the range and overplanted crops
during favorable weather and high prices, leading to serious failures
during drought, excess summer heat, and freezing winters.66
Government policies and economic conditions encouraged boom cycles
when commodity prices rose and export markets expanded; and booms
were driven by advancements in agricultural technology, such as the
steel plow, the gasoline-powered tractor, and the combine.67 Thus, as
with overuse of water, ultimately an excess use or misuse of resources
(land, capital, and technology) during the rich times, rather than simply
an absence of resources during the poor times, contributed to the
vulnerability of Great Plains agriculturalists to drought.
The ultimate example came during the Dust Bowl years of the Great
Depression, which devastated both the land and its settlers.68 The
physical causes of the Dust Bowl were the heat and drought—the worst
to date in the measured meteorological record throughout much of the
United States.69 However, similar conditions of wind, drought, and heat
had occurred previously, without the dramatic dust storms, soil erosion,
and other catastrophic environmental impacts.70 Overgrazing denuded
63. See DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11, at 30–31; Popper & Popper, supra note 62, at
12–13; THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 40–44; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at
35–37, 46–63, 71–80.
64. See DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11, at 57–58; THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS,
supra note 11, at 27–28, 64; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 38. Static views about farming and
weather also led to false assumptions in Australia, South Africa, and other regions in which
Europeans introduced historical practices in very different climates. See Donald A. Wilhite et
al., National Drought Policy: Lessons Learned from Australia, South Africa, and the United
States, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23, at 137, 149, 153–54.
65. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
66. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 53–62; JOHNSON, supra note
11, at 35–38, 55–63, 75–91, 101–05, 109–22.
67. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 40–42; JOHNSON, supra note
11, at 35, 37, 77, 109–10, 112–14, 116, 127–35.
68. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 40–42; JOHNSON, supra note
11, at 155–96; PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23, at vii.
69. See DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11, at 8–9.
70. In the native prairies of the region, a dense and diverse flora of drought-resistant
grasses stabilized the soil during periods of high winds, and the native species evolved to
withstand periods of heat, cold, aridity, and rain. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra
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the natural rangelands, and mechanical plowing, cultivation, and harvest
in long, straight rows exposed the underlying topsoil to the effects of
heat, wind, and drought.71
Likewise, the Dust Bowl highlights the relationship between
unsustainable fiscal and economic policies and drought vulnerability.
Enticed by easy access to credit and optimism that land values and
commodity prices would inevitably continue to rise, farmers and
absentee owners saddled themselves with mortgages and chattel debt to
finance a new generation of efficient but expensive equipment to
support the industrial farm economy.72 When crop prices declined
dramatically or when crop yields fell or failed altogether due to drought
and the accompanying dust storms, this speculation and leverage could
not be sustained. Land values plummeted, and farmers had no reserves
to cover their debt and to buy seed grain or livestock feed to carry them
through the protracted drought. This left insufficient equity to cover
loans, leading to farm failures, bankruptcies, foreclosures, and bank
failures.73
The U.S. government responded to the Dust Bowl with drought
relief and other agricultural policies designed both to provide
compassionate assistance to farmers and to change farming practices to
prevent similar effects in the future.74 Some policies sought to reduce
vulnerability through more sustainable farming practices, such as
conservation tillage, planting of windbreaks, and return of marginal
farmlands to native grasses.75 Price supports, bankruptcy relief, and
crop insurance were adopted to reduce the financial vulnerability of
affected communities to natural variables such as drought and to
fluctuations in domestic and global agricultural markets.76 However, as
note 11, at 23; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 164–66; Popper & Popper, supra note 61, at 16
(quoting a late nineteenth century Pawnee chief in northeast Colorado who lamented, “Grass [is]
no good upside down”).
71. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 27, 32, 40, 43, 49; JOHNSON,
supra note 11, at 37, 114–15, 165–66.
72. See DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11, at 30; THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT P LAINS, supra
note 11, at 42, 45, 53; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 122, 130–32.
73. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 10, at 45, 53–54; JOHNSON, supra
note 11, at 122, 130–32.
74. See infra Subsection II.B.2.b.
75. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 198–201, 218–20, 227–28, 231–44.
76. See id. at 213–14, 227–28; William S. Eubanks, II, The Sustainable Farm Bill: A
Proposal for Permanent Environmental Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,493, 10,494–95 (2009);
L. Leon Geyer, Risk-Sharing Down on the Farm: A Comparison of Farmer Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Statutes or Selling the Farm, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 331, 332–34 (1997); Opie, supra
note 11, at 250–51. See generally DONALD A. WILHITE, NORMAN J. ROSENBERG & MICHAEL H.
GLANTZ, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO DROUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES, LESSONS FROM THE MID1970S, PART 2, THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE IN THE GREAT PLAINS, 1850–1950S (1984)
[hereinafter THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE].
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discussed further in Part II, some of those policies can contribute to
vulnerability by distorting risk decisions by farmers about what crops to
grow and under what conditions.
The federal government also subsidized a large system of dams to
store water for irrigation during times of low precipitation in the Great
Plains.77 Widespread use of the centrifugal pump to power deep wells
and center pivot irrigation systems later allowed farmers to tap into the
High Plains aquifer.78 As a result, Great Plains farmers no longer need
to rely entirely on precipitation to support millions of farmed acres.
Productivity has increased even further due to hybrid crops, fertilizers,
pesticides, and herbicides.79 This technologically assisted increase in
productivity, however, is unlikely to last indefinitely. Groundwater
levels in the High Plains aquifer have plummeted,80 and water demand
for crops and livestock will increase with rising temperatures.81 These
factors may once again render the Great Plains vulnerable to drought
caused by climate disruption.
2. Comparison to Recent Droughts in California
In 1988, drought blanketed large portions of the United States, from
California to the Northwest, eastward to the Northern Rockies and the
Upper Midwest, and as far south as Georgia. The drought was most
pronounced in California and other western states, where it persisted
through 1992.82 Because of improved response capability, a much more
diversified economy, and the increased capacity and resilience of water
and agricultural infrastructure in California and other parts of the United
States, however, both the response to the California drought and its
social, economic, and human impacts were vastly different than those
experienced during the Dust Bowl. It would reflect another form of
complacency, however, to assume that the same would be true if even
longer and more severe droughts occur due to climate disruption.
From a meteorological perspective, the California drought of the late
1980s and early 1990s was as severe as that of the late 1920s and early
77. See Popper & Popper, supra note 62, at 14.
78. See JOHN OPIE, OGALLALA: WATER FOR A DRY LAND 129–32, 146–49 (1993).
79. See Eubanks, supra note 76, at 10, 497–98.
80. See OPIE, supra note 78, at 5–6, 162–65; U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FACT SHEET FS078-03: WATER-LEVEL CHANGES IN THE HIGH PLAINS AQUIFER, PREDEVELOPMENT TO 2001, 1999
TO 2000, AND 2000 TO 2001 (2003); DAVID E. KROMM & STEPHEN E. WHITE, CONSERVING
WATER IN THE HIGH PLAINS 1–3 (1990).
81. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 19, at 124
(“Current water use on the Great Plains is unsustainable, as the High Plains aquifer continues to
be tapped faster than the rate of recharge.”).
82. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER RESOURCES: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO
MONITOR AND COORDINATE RESPONSES TO DROUGHT 2 (1993) [hereinafter FEDERAL EFFORTS TO
MONITOR AND COORDINATE RESPONSES TO DROUGHT].
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1930s, and in some parts of the state it was the worst in the twentieth
century.83 Some sources estimated gross agricultural losses in excess of
$500 million and increased ratepayer electric costs in the range of $3
billion.84 However, the California drought did not cause the massive
economic, social, and political impacts that similar droughts caused
during the Great Depression. The water resources infrastructure
developed by the federal and state governments and the private sector
since the early twentieth century buffered the region against the full
effects of the drought.85 Because it has a sufficiently sophisticated set of
legal and political institutions, California reduced demand through
efficiency improvements adopted, encouraged, or required by municipal
and agricultural users, and reallocated water among users through water
banks and other market tools.86 Still, by the end of the drought, reserves
of both surface water and groundwater had declined, meaning that more
serious impacts might have occurred if the drought had continued.
California is unlikely to be able to “store its way” out of the more
severe and protracted declines in precipitation and snowpack expected
due to climate disruption.87 Moreover, reservoirs and extensive related
83. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 4–5; NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER
MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at 23.
84. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 29 n.4, 35, 45. Other impacts included
increased monetary and energy costs to pump and move water, lost hydroelectrical generation
and higher costs to replace it (in money and pollution), reduced agricultural income and
increased costs to purchase livestock feed and other inputs, millions of dollars in losses due to
depleted salmon stocks, declining waterfowl populations, increased forest fires and ensuing
damage to property and natural resources, declining tourism and recreation, especially to the ski
industry, diminished supplies to municipal users, and weakened natural ecosystems. Id. at 17–
58.
85. Colorado River water stored in Lake Mead and Lake Powell during the early 1980s
offset shortages from other sources, and California’s own system of more than 150 major
reservoirs provided additional reserves during the early years of the drought. As a result,
California farmers did not face reduced water deliveries for at least the first three years of the
drought. Additional water stored in aquifers offset declining surface water supplies. See id. at 5;
see also NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at 25.
86. See generally BRENT M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO
ALLOCATE WATER IN CALIFORNIA (2000) (describing California’s water allocation system and
its complex legal approach to water rights). Those programs and transactions have been
criticized on numerous grounds as insufficient, inefficient, and not reflective of true markets.
See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water
Law Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 422–28 (2008); Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent
California Water Transfers: Implications for Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 5,
14 (1995). There is little doubt, however, that the effects of the drought would have been worse
absent those market-based water transfers.
87. See Ajay Kalra et al., Changes in U.S. Streamflow and Western U.S. Snowpack, 13 J.
HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING 156, 156 (2008); Philip W. Mote, Climate-Driven Variability and
Trends in Mountain Snowpack in Western North America, 19 J. CLIMATE 6209, 6209 (2006);
Philip W. Mote et al., Declining Mountain Snowpack in Western North America, 2005 BULL.
AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 39, 39.
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water diversions and conveyances cause serious environmental impacts
that reduce the health of ecosystems in other ways.88
The California drought was also buffered by the diverse economies
of California and other affected states, and by the size, diversity,
flexibility, and economic strength of the United States as a whole.
Although some economic sectors incurred more harm than others, the
economy of the state and the region was better able to withstand the
effects of the drought because some sources of jobs and income are
relatively less dependent on water than others, and because resulting tax
and other revenues could be invested in drought response and relief
efforts.89 Even within California, if the market functions properly, gross
income from declining yields can be offset in part by increased crop
prices due to declining supplies.90 Moreover, given the national or
international scope of agricultural markets, the absence of trade barriers,
and the presence of functional markets within the country, declines in
crop yields in one region can be offset by increased production
elsewhere, as in fact occurred during the California drought.91
D. Implications for Drought Mitigation in a Disrupted Climate
The nature and characterization of drought suggest several distinct
focal points for the analysis of future law and policy. First, viewed from
the perspective of meteorological drought, and as Dean David Getches
and Professor Janet Neuman have both noted independently, we need to
abandon the concept of drought as an aberrational phenomenon, rather
than as a regular part of the inherently variable climates of particular
regions.92 Conceptualizing drought as an aberrational phenomenon
88. See ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED
SENSE OF IMMENSITY 55–69 (2007).
89. For example, large southern California municipalities were able to pay farmers in the
Imperial Valley to fallow land and to improve irrigation efficiency in ways that allowed more
water to be conveyed to the thirsty, still thriving cities. See Israel & Lund, supra note 86, at 7–
11; Kevin M. O’Brien & Robert R. Gunning, Water Marketing in California Revisited: The
Legacy of the 1987–92 Drought, 25 PAC. L.J. 1053, 1054 (1994).
90. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 29–30.
91. See NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at
14. Shifts in regional production cause distributive changes in farm income. However, given that
drought strikes different agricultural areas over longer periods of time, temporary distributive
effects can even out over time, with each region gaining or losing relative market share during
different periods. Moreover, if the locus of agricultural production shifts in the face of regional
drought, a country as a whole will not face food shortages and resulting malnutrition. The ability
of farmers in a drought-stricken region to withstand temporary shifts in production and income,
however, depends on their overall economic condition, cash and other reserves, or the existence
of government risk allocation programs (price supports, crop insurance, or otherwise) to carry
them through the crisis. In California, the agricultural sector was strong enough to bear the
drought impacts. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 39.
92. See, e.g., Getches, supra note 13, at 7 (critiquing water policies that assume “normal”
or “average” precipitation); Janet C. Neuman, Drought Proofing Water Law, 7 U. DENV. WATER
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encourages maximum use of water during wet periods, leaving little or
no resilience to drought during drier periods. Of course, any statistical
probability curve has high and low extremes, at increasingly remote
levels of probability. Thus, even an approach to water law and policy
that considers a range of expected conditions must reflect some policy
decision about what extreme conditions should be considered
aberrational—that is, beyond the range of probability for which prudent
managers should be expected to plan. Moreover, climate change now
introduces a considerable amount of additional uncertainty about the
range of expected precipitation and other conditions (such as
temperature and evaporation rates) that affect water resources supply
and demand, and the frequency with which drought conditions should
be expected relative to past cycles.
Second, the three effects-based definitions of drought (agricultural,
hydrologic, and socioeconomic), all of which reflect an imbalance
between available water supply and some aspect of human or
environmental demand, suggest that drought response must focus on
both the supply and demand sides of the equation. Drought relief and
response efforts that rely exclusively on financial aid and emergency
water supplies will miss important opportunities for drought mitigation,
particularly those that can be implemented in advance of drought.
Vulnerability analysis suggests some of these same lessons for
drought response, but it unearths other lessons as well. Societies will be
vulnerable to drought if they push the limits of water resources during
wet periods, leaving little or no reserve during drought. Adequate
reserves will become increasingly important if droughts become more
frequent and more severe due to climate disruption because there will be
little to no time for recovery between droughts. Likewise, because
wasteful societies will be more vulnerable to drought, future drought
prevention and response efforts should focus as much on demand-side
strategies as on supply-side strategies. Vulnerability analysis, however,
also suggests that policymakers should focus on broader policies that
drive decisions about how much water is used and for what purposes.
Those policies include government subsidies and insurance policies, as
well as the levels of risk deemed appropriate by private financial
markets. Further, drought policies might include broader economic and
resource-based strategies to prevent and mitigate drought risks, such as
restoring ecosystem components that can buffer drought impacts
(including wetlands, floodplains, and other natural water storage areas),
diversifying economically in drought-prone regions, establishing legal
and market institutions to reallocate water and products produced with
L. REV. 92, 94–96 (2003) (noting that both droughts and floods are just extremes of the
spectrum of “normal” or “average” conditions).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 4

222

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

water, and designing relief strategies to promote self-reliance, rather
than dependence or risky economic decisions that perpetuate cycles of
vulnerability.
II. U.S. WATER, DROUGHT, AND AGRICULTURAL LAW IN A DISRUPTED
CLIMATE
Water law allocates a scarce resource among competing users and
defines rights and interests in that resource according to a predictable
set of rules. Thus, it would be logical to assume that water law would
have the most influence on the use and allocation of water during times
of greatest scarcity, and therefore the most impact on behavior and
vulnerability in anticipation of and during a drought. It is notable, then,
that drought experts have referred to existing law as imposing
constraints on sound drought management and policy, rather than
serving as a beneficial tool.93 Law governing water allocation during
drought poses a balance between compassion and risk because water is
essential to lives and livelihoods, but guaranteed water has the potential
to encourage waste and thereby to increase vulnerability.
A disconnect arguably exists between water law and drought policy
in the United States for several reasons. First, although state water law
varies considerably,94 by and large it addresses drought planning and
response as an afterthought. Especially in the arid and semi-arid regions
of the country most prone to drought, state water law is primarily an
instrument of water resource development,95 and drought policies
generally have been tacked on incidentally in response to drought
emergencies. Second, to the significant extent that federal law also
influences water resources,96 it too is generally designed to promote
resource development rather than sustainable water use and
conservation.97 Third, agriculture is the second largest consumptive user
of water in the United States (after thermoelectric power plants, which
use huge volumes of water for cooling); and agriculture is especially
dominant in areas historically prone to drought.98 Since the New Deal,
93. See, e.g., Wilhite et al., supra note 23, at 103.
94. In the United States, water law is largely dictated by individual states. See Adler,
supra note 17, at 4–5.
95. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317,
320–21 (1985).
96. See Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests Vs. State
Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 253; David H.
Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions
Eclipsed the State Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 8 (2001).
97. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973,
1013–37 (1995); Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 657, 657–58 (1989).
98. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED WATER USE IN THE UNITED
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federal intervention in agricultural markets, especially for the largest
commodity crops,99 is arguably the dominant factor driving production
in the agricultural sector, including decisions affecting water use.100
Therefore, analysis of U.S. drought law and policy and the changes
needed in the face of climate disruption should focus on both federal
and state law, and on both agricultural and water law.101 What is
remarkably constant across these areas of law, however, is the tension
between the goals of providing drought relief (compassion) and
reducing drought vulnerability (risk).
A. State Law and Policy
The major doctrines of U.S. water law are not well suited to
problems of scarcity.102 This is ironic because, absent scarcity, “the role
of water law is relatively insignificant.”103 As such, the question
becomes what modifications to water law are warranted as a means of
adaptation to drought.
1. State Water Law and Policy
The manner in which water law might address drought can be
viewed from two perspectives: (1) the policy question of what goals we
want to achieve during drought, and (2) the structural question of what
legal means are best suited to achieve those goals. One potential goal of
water law is to buffer water users from the adverse impacts of drought,
either by enhancing or rationing water supplies or by providing
economic compensation or relief. An alternative policy goal, however,
is to provide incentives for more water sustainable practices to reduce
STATES 2005 (2009).
99. A “commodity” crop is an agricultural product that is easy to store and transport (as
opposed to being quickly perishable) and can therefore be traded on large scales or stored,
depending on market conditions. See Charlene C. Kwan, Note, Fixing the Farm Bill: Using the
“Permanent Provisions” in Agricultural Law to Achieve WTO Compliance, 36 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 571, 574 (2009).
100. See id.; Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon and Conservation: Rethinking U.S.
Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 597–98
(2010); John H. Davidson, The Federal Farm Bill and the Environment, 18 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 3, 4 (2003).
101. Other sectors of the economy, of course, can also have significant water demands.
This analysis focuses on agricultural water use and demand because of its predominance in the
water economy.
102. Adler, supra note 17, at 18–26; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to
the Twenty-First Century, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 539, 543–44 (2004); A. Dan Tarlock, Now, Think
Again About Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 173–75 (1992); Frank J. Trelease,
Climatic Change and Water Law, in CLIMATE, CLIMATIC CHANGE, AND WATER SUPPLY 70, 70–
71 (1977).
103. Christine A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 403, 409 (2009).
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the frequency and impact of effects-based drought. Consistent with the
thesis of this Article, however, those two goals may conflict. The
knowledge that government relief is likely during drought can reduce
incentives to take precautionary measures against it.
Structurally, there are several possible approaches to drought in
water law. The first, “drought neutrality,” would maintain uniform rules
of water law regardless of the balance between water supply and
demand at any given time, that is, any separate body of “drought law”
would not modify the general rules of water law. Indeed, if water law is
significant mainly in times of scarcity, and if the background system of
water law is modified significantly for scarcity conditions, then the
exception would swallow the rule. In theory, under a drought-neutral
approach, stable legal rules would allow the market to allocate water in
scarcity as well as abundance, while providing incentives to use water
efficiently. As such, there would be no need for special drought
allocation rules. Water users would make risk decisions on the basis of
the background legal regime and have an incentive to use market
mechanisms to reallocate water more efficiently.104 In theory, those with
preferred rights would have an incentive to use water more efficiently
so they would have more rights to sell during shortages; those with less
preferred legal rights would also have an incentive to conserve in order
to avoid unnecessary purchase costs. Over time, these incentives might
prompt rational parties to engage in more sustainable water practices in
advance, rather than waiting for a drought to occur. Various aspects of
U.S. water law, however, impose barriers to such efficient marketing of
water rights.105 As a result, “winners” under the prevailing legal regimes
do not necessarily have significant incentive to conserve.
The second approach, “drought exceptionalism,” would modify the
usual rules of water law during periods of drought to provide relief to
affected users or to allocate the risk of loss in a manner that differs from
what would occur under nondrought conditions. A threshold question
regarding drought exceptionalism is how to define the exception—that
is, how to establish the conditions under which background rules are
modified or under which some form of relief is provided. This threshold
question obviously relates to the problems of drought definition already
104. See Tarlock, supra note 102, at 173–74 (describing “[w]ater marketing,” a similar
approach calling for “the voluntary sale and transfer of existing rights to new uses,” which is
currently the “remedy of choice to reallocate more water to higher valued uses”); Trelease,
supra note 102, at 73 (describing water reallocation in terms of economic incentives).
105. See CRAIG BELL & JEFF TAYLOR, WATER LAWS AND POLICIES FOR A SUSTAINABLE
FUTURE: A WESTERN STATES’ PERSPECTIVE 109–22 (2008); Dellapenna, supra note 102, at 573;
C. Peter Goplerud III, The Permit Process and Colorado’s Exception, in 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 14.04 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991); Tarlock, supra note 102, at 173. But see Jedediah
Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987–2005, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
1021, 1041–50 (2007).
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discussed. If there is no clear ex ante definition of drought, water users
have insufficient signals by which to alter their conduct or to assess the
real risk of loss under various conditions. If a water law regime triggers
special drought provisions too readily, the background rules become
largely irrelevant, as suggested above, and users have little incentive to
take actions to prevent or otherwise provide for shortages.
The third and most common approach to drought in water law is, for
want of a better term, ad hoc. This approach responds to individual
droughts with specific changes that either remain embedded in the
background system of water law, or expire when the emergency ends or
is perceived to have ended. The ad hoc approach has the benefit of
flexibility because water law modifications and relief provisions can be
tailored to variable drought conditions and impacts. Different impacts
on human and environmental water uses might suggest different legal
and policy responses. An ad hoc approach leaves water users with less
clear signals by which to assess risk. Ironically, however, compared to a
system of drought exceptionalism with hairpin triggers for relief, the
very uncertainty that the ad hoc approach creates might actually
increase incentives to engage in preventive and more sustainable
behavior. If the government establishes a pattern of frequent or
inevitable relief, on the other hand, incentives will evaporate, even if the
precise nature of the relief varies.
The system of riparian rights, which is prevalent in the eastern
United States, generally assumes abundant supplies that can be divided
equitably among competing users, so long as uses are reasonable and do
not unduly interfere with the rights of other users.106 Pure riparian rights
systems, in theory, allocate scarce water among competing users
according to equitable factors, requiring everyone to share in the risk of
scarcity.107 That system works so long as each user retains enough water
to continue economically viable uses; however, if the resulting cutbacks
leave all (or most) users below the minimum level necessary to remain
viable, then the perverse result is all losers and no winners.108 Even
under common law administration of riparian rights, however, courts
have often established de facto preferences among users, but without
statutory guidance on how to make such choices and with an apparent
preference for large water users.109 Moreover, especially under
106. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under “Pure” Riparian
Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(c) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979); Adler, supra note 17, at 19;
Dellapenna, supra note 105, § 7.02(d)(3).
108. See Adler, supra note 17, at 19.
109. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at
the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 14–16 (2002)
(illustrating how courts may account for economic impacts when deciding water rights cases).
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emergency conditions, it is extremely inefficient to address shortages
via case-by-case litigation. The uncertainty and instability inherent in
such case-specific allocation leaves large water users, who typically
receive greater judicial protection, with little or no incentive to engage
in more sustainable practices. Under more recent statutory and
administrative systems of riparian rights, statutory preferences operate
much as they might in prior appropriation states, with the same weak
incentives for conservation.110 The administrative process, however,
allows allocation decisions to be made more efficiently and before use,
rather than in a post hoc dispute.111 An administrative system also
allows agencies to impose efficiency requirements as a condition of
water use permits.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, which prevails in the arid
western United States, rights are assigned according to priority of
use.112 Thus, because senior appropriators are entitled to their full
apportionment before junior appropriators receive any water, the system
avoids the “everyone loses” problem.113 Under this system, however,
the “winners” still have little incentive to conserve until water is so
scarce that they, too, face shortages. In theory, prior appropriation
incorporates a prohibition against waste and limits water rights to
“beneficial use,” defined in part by reference to the amount of water
reasonably necessary to support the intended use.114 In practice,
however, those tenets of prior appropriation law have been enforced
weakly (at best).115 Moreover, although prior appropriation may allocate
scarce water more efficiently in drought than is true under riparian
rights, it does so in ways that tend to embed historic uses at the expense
of economic efficiency or other societal preferences. Impediments to
water marketing have limited its effectiveness in reallocating scarce
water to uses that are either economically or environmentally more
valuable.116 Finally, because abundant storage and conveyance systems
have buffered arid western states from significant problems of scarcity
thus far, the prior appropriation system has not yet been tested

110. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 9.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991); Dellapenna, supra note 102, at 586–88.
111. See Klein et al., supra note 103, at 411.
112. See Robert E. Beck, Prevalence and Definition, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 12.03(b), (c) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
113. See Adler, supra note 17, at 24; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of Water
Management to Global Climate Change and Other Hydropolitical Stresses, 35 J. AM. WATER
RESOURCES ASS’N. 1301, 1305 (1999); Trelease, supra note 102, at 72.
114. See Beck, supra note 112, § 12.03(c)(2).
115. See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 975 (1998).
116. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; Adler, supra note 17, at 25–26.
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extensively in times of extreme drought.117
Neither riparian rights nor prior appropriation, therefore, provide
significant incentives for efficiency improvements designed to reduce
drought vulnerability. The next question is whether states have modified
those legal regimes in ways that do so, or whether they focus more on
short-term relief.
2. State Drought Law and Policy
In many state water law systems, drought is not addressed as a
distinct concept—the drought-neutrality approach. Professor Robert
Beck’s classic two-volume treatise on water law addresses the topic of
drought only rarely, and even then as an adjunct to other topics.118 State
water law is not, however, entirely drought-neutral. There are notable
exceptions in the law of some states in which water rights and
obligations can be modified in the event of drought, or which provide
for other responses to drought conditions.119
The closest thing to a universal state response to drought is
contingency planning, sometimes done as a requirement of state law.120
Although comprehensive state drought planning is a relatively recent
phenomenon,121 to the extent that drought plans identify response
117. See Tarlock, supra note 102, at 175–76.
118. See Robert E. Beck, The Uses of and Demands for Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 2.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (discussing the failure of the 1961 Senate Select
Committee’s attempts to plan for water shortages and the National Water Commission’s later
view that such planning was not of significant concern). Ironically, the authors of that treatise
discuss efforts by riparian states, as opposed to the more arid prior appropriation states, to plan
for shortages via regulated riparianism, see Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 9.05(d), supra, and discuss and critique the fact that many states
address drought only through contingency emergency planning rather than imposing more
restrictive conditions under conditions of both plenty and scarcity, Robert E. Beck,
Appropriable Waters, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 13.01, supra.
119. See, e.g., Melinda Kassen, Statutory Expansion of State Agencies’ Authority to
Administer and Develop Water Resources in Response to Colorado’s Drought, 7 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV 47, 48–50 (2003); Neuman, supra note 92 (discussing how “drought is a normal
and recurrent feature of the climate throughout the United States”).
120. E.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.116(III) (2011) (requiring N.Y. State
Drought Management Task Force to approve a State Drought Management Coordination Plan);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-715 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring the state and local governments to
create and update, for fully appropriated basins, river basin management plans that consider,
inter alia, drought conditions and water supply); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3112(a)(1) (West
2009) (mandating state and regional water plans for both normal and drought conditions).
121. The first state to adopt a comprehensive drought management plan was Colorado, in
1981. Polly Ann Najarian, An Analysis of State Drought Plans: A Model Drought Plan Proposal
(Dec. 2000) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Nebraska at Lincoln), at 5. By December,
2010, forty-four states had drought plans, one had delegated drought planning to local
authorities, and three states were in the process of plan development. Drought Planning
Resources, by State, NAT’L DROUGHT MITIGATION CTR., http://drought.unl.edu/Planning/
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strategies and criteria in advance, the trend suggests a shift away from a
purely ad hoc, reactive approach to drought response. Moreover,
comprehensive drought management plans can generate objective
signals by which water users might guide decisions about water use and
drought risk. A series of government agencies and commissions have
concluded that more comprehensive drought policies are needed to
anticipate and to mitigate drought impacts.122 In response, many states
have adopted drought management plans, guided in part by the
recommendations of Professor Donald Wilhite and his colleagues at the
National Drought Management Center at the University of Nebraska.123
That work recommends that drought planning focus on advance
mitigation to reduce vulnerability,124 as well as monitoring, prediction,
response, and relief during droughts.125 It also notes that providing
compensation without regard to whether preventive measures had been
taken disincentivizes mitigation.126
Drought mitigation plans alone, however, do not ensure a risk
reduction approach, as opposed to one that focuses on providing relief
when droughts occur. Many current state plans continue to focus largely
on response; only a few have shifted to mitigation and prevention to
reduce vulnerability.127 The content of state drought response plans, of
course, must reflect the relevant substantive aspects of state laws and
regulations, which vary considerably in the manner in which they
balance the goals of drought relief and risk reduction. There are
legitimate reasons why state drought plans and legal provisions might
PlanningInfobyState.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
122. See, e.g., WESTERN GOVERNORS’ POLICY OFFICE (WESTPO), INSTITUTE FOR POLICY
RESEARCH, MANAGING RESOURCE SCARCITY: LESSONS FROM THE MID-SEVENTIES DROUGHT, A
REPORT FOR THE GOVERNORS ON DROUGHT MANAGEMENT 34–36 (1978) [hereinafter MANAGING
RESOURCE SCARCITY]; NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra
note 27, at v–vii, 17–19; PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23, at v–vi,
1, 33; W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N., DROUGHT RESPONSE ACTION PLAN 1, 3 (1996).
123. See Donald A. Wilhite, A Methodology for Drought Preparedness, 13 NAT. HAZARDS
229, 231, 251 (1996) [hereinafter Wilhite, A Methodology for Drought Preparedness]; Donald
A. Wilhite, Drought Planning: A Process for State Government, 27 WATER RESOURCES BULL.
29, 30 (1991) [hereinafter Drought Planning: A Process for State Government]; Najarian, supra
note 121. See generally CODY KNUTSON ET AL., HOW TO REDUCE DROUGHT RISK (1998)
(describing actions that should be taken to reduce the potential impacts from droughts before the
droughts occur).
124. “Mitigation is defined as actions taken in advance of or in the early stages of drought
that reduce the impacts of the event.” Wilhite et al., supra note 23, at 118. For potential risk
reduction actions listed by the Center, see CODY KNUTSON ET AL., supra note 123, at E-1 to E-5.
125. See Najarian, supra note 121, at 5–8, 31–34; Wilhite, A Methodology for Drought
Preparedness, supra note 123, at 239–40.
126. See Najarian, supra note 121, at 9.
127. See id. at 5, 68–70; Donald A. Wilhite, Drought Planning and Risk Assessment: Status
and Future Directions, 39 ANNALS ARID ZONE 211, 213–14 (2000) (singling out New Mexico,
Utah, Nebraska, Texas, and Georgia as increasing their focus on mitigation and prevention).
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vary due to differences in climate, hydrology, economics, population,
and other variables.128 However, certain guiding principles might help
states determine appropriate policies to reduce vulnerability while still
providing drought relief.
Few state statutes pay careful attention to the issue of drought
definition.129 Under many state statutes, the Governor, other state
officials or agencies, or interstate bodies have authority to declare
drought on an ad hoc basis, with either vague or nonexistent statutory
criteria defining the conditions under which drought relief is
appropriate.130 Some states define drought by statute or regulation, but
without sufficient specificity to provide a clear signal to water users or
to reflect a considered policy judgment about when responses are
appropriate.131 Other states are more specific in defining drought.
Kansas requires water providers to develop adequate water supplies to

128. See Margaret S. Hrezo et al., Integrating Drought Planning into Water Resources
Management, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 141, 167 (1986) (arguing that both the content and the
feasibility of state drought responses vary due to a range of physical and political factors).
129. See supra Section I.B (addressing the various definitions of “drought”).
130. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-192 (2011) (authorizing Arizona Governor to
declare an emergency due to weather conditions, implicitly including drought, and noting
drought emergencies declared in 1989, 1998, and 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2104
(West 2010) (authorizing the Colorado Governor to suspend laws and create new laws during
declared disasters, including drought); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.266(1) (West 2004)
(authorizing the Iowa Governor to proclaim disaster emergency “due to a drought or other event
affecting water resources of the state”); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3102 (West 2009)
(providing for “drought or other water resource shortage declared by proclamation of the
Governor”); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82A-408 (1997) (authorizing Kansas Board of County
Commissioners to declare drought emergencies); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D-16 (West 1990) (the
Delaware River Basin Compact, which authorizes a commission to declare drought emergency
with the consent of all parties); 4 PA. Code § 119.1 (2011) (allowing the Governor to designate
any area of the Commonwealth as being in a drought); 32 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 820.1 11.4(a)
(West 1997) (authorizing the Susquehanna River Basin Commission to declare a drought
emergency); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-166-010 (2011) (authorizing the Washington
Department of Ecology to declare a drought emergency).
131. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:19-1.3 (2011) (defining drought as “a condition of
dryness due to lower than normal precipitation, resulting in reduced stream flows, reduced soil
moisture and/or a lowering of the potentiometric surface in wells”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 20
(McKinney 2011) (delineating disasters, including droughts, as “occurrence or imminent threat
of wide spread or severe damage, injury, or loss of life or property resulting from any natural or
man-made causes”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 5.116(I) (2011) (providing for a
sequence of “drought watch,” “drought warning,” “drought emergency,” and “drought disaster”
based on a drought-forecasting plan tied to “indicators such as precipitation deficits, surface and
ground water levels, reservoir storage and soil moisture”); 4 PA. CODE § 112.3 (2011) (defining
natural disasters as including drought and other catastrophes that result “in damage to property,
hardship, suffering or possible loss of life”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.014 (West 2005)
(authorizing the Texas Governor to declare a drought disaster, but not specifying qualifying
conditions for drought).
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meet needs during a drought with a 2% probability of occurrence.132
Although experts might quibble with technical aspects of this definition,
and although it might have to be reevaluated if conditions change due to
climate disruption, it provides at least some signal regarding the
probability and severity of conditions considered to constitute drought.
However, even this definition is designed for water resources
management planning, not necessarily to trigger financial or other
drought relief.
The absence or vagueness of statutory or regulatory triggers for
drought relief and response has some advantages because it provides
flexibility to address a range of different drought timing and conditions.
For example, a short, intense period of low precipitation might warrant
different responses than a longer, less severe reduction in precipitation.
However, leaving the declaration of drought entirely to the discretion of
the Governor or other state officials on an ad hoc basis can cause
important decisions about when to provide drought relief or to trigger
conservation or mitigation requirements to be based on political
considerations, rather than on a policy determination of what will result
in the most appropriate balance between short-term drought relief and
long-term risk reduction.
It would be preferable for state statutes or regulations to establish
explicit standards dictating when drought relief or response measures
are appropriate. Such standards would signal water users about the
conditions under which the state will provide relief, thus encouraging
prevention-oriented risk decisions. Stricter triggers for relief will place
users at greater risk of loss, but will encourage sustainable practices to
reduce vulnerability. For example, states might borrow from policies
adopted in Australia in 1992 to encourage agricultural practices
appropriate to regional climate and hydrology.133 Drought legislation
could require farmers and other water users to plan for the “normal”
range of meteorological conditions rather than provide relief whenever
132. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-928 (1997) (municipal water supplies), 82a-1303 (state
conservation storage supply). Likewise, private water rights applicants must prove capacity for
beneficial use during a drought with a two percent probability of occurrence. Id. § 82a-1304.
The statutory standard is specified by regulation as a drought having a statistical chance of
occurring once every fifty years, on average, which the state assumes is equivalent to conditions
measured in the drought record from 1952–1957. See KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 98-5-1, 98-5-8
(2011).
133. Australia decided that providing relief under what might be referred to as conditions
of “normal” aridity in a given region encouraged unsustainable farming practices and that relief
should be provided only for conditions that a prudent farmer could not have reasonably
predicted. The policy was modified over time in response to later droughts to provide relief
payments in “exceptional circumstances,” a standard that proved difficult and somewhat
arbitrary to administer absent more precise criteria. See Wilhite et al., supra note 64, at 142–45;
PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23, at 5, 24.
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precipitation falls below “average.” Legislators or other decisionmakers
would have to make tough decisions about what range within the
regional precipitation probability curve should define extraordinary
conditions beyond which prudent businesses should be expected to plan.
If precipitation patterns shift as much as predicted due to climate
change, making those decisions will become increasingly complex.
Moreover, to effectuate the desired policy goal, state legislatures and
regulatory officials need to exercise restraint in the face of specific
drought emergencies. Further, these decisionmakers should avoid
pressure from affected interest groups to provide ad hoc financial or
regulatory relief that minimizes the effectiveness of the intended
incentives.
A second centerpiece of many state drought statutes is funding for
drought relief. Although state drought relief funding is miniscule
compared to the massive amount of federal drought relief,134 it is the
most obvious example of programs for which the balance between
compassion and risk is particularly challenging. Many states provide for
open-ended or vaguely defined financial relief to various categories of
drought victims,135 sometimes through tax or regulatory relief,136 or
relief from private sector economic consequences137 rather than direct
payments. Other states, however, fund projects designed to prevent or
reduce drought impacts.138 Unconditioned, easily triggered financial
relief is more likely to reduce drought impacts to individuals and
businesses, but provides few incentives to reduce vulnerability. Either
134. See infra Subsection II.B.2; PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 23, at 12, 18.
135. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN, § 24-32-2106 (West 2010) (granting general funding
for community disaster recovery, including for droughts); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-702
(LexisNexis 2010) (funding to alleviate adverse impacts of regulatory decisions necessary to
protect water resources); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.073 (West 2005) (providing funds from
disaster contingency fund if the Governor determines that the demands placed on funding
normally appropriated to local and state agencies are excessively great for coping with a specific
emergency); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.83B.415, 43.83B.430 (West 2007) (providing for
grants and loans for members of the agricultural community suffering from drought).
136. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.5 (West 2011) (tax relief for involuntary livestock
sales due to drought); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-7-1 (2011) (relief from nonuse or forfeiture
provision of state water law where water is not available due to drought); TEX. AGRIC. CODE
ANN. §§ 161.054, 163.066 (West 2004) (variance from restrictions on livestock movement).
137. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 570.4 (West 1992) (limitations on crop liens); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 654.15 (West 2011) (deferral of foreclosure caused by drought).
138. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-60-121, 37-60-123.5 (West 2010) (funding for
water conservation and stream flow restoration projects, and loans or grants to fund water
augmentation projects for agrarians suffering from effects of declared droughts); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19-3001, 19-3002 (2007) (allowing Kansas counties to spend funds for drought relief
wells and other emergency water supply projects); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-166-010, 173166-090 (2011) (providing funding for projects designed to “alleviate drought conditions
relating to agricultural and fisheries survival”).
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stingier financial relief programs, stricter (or at least clearer) definitions
of drought to trigger relief, or programs conditioned on advance
prevention and mitigation are more likely to promote drought risk
reduction. Likewise, spending money to augment water supplies or
otherwise to reduce drought severity once drought begins is likely to
reduce human and economic suffering, but predrought investments to
reduce water demand are more likely to reduce long-term vulnerability.
There has been some trend toward increased use of mitigation in
state drought plans.139 One mitigation strategy is temporary reallocation
of water rights or suspension or limitation of withdrawal privileges
during drought. Some states, for example, restrict or prohibit water
withdrawals during declared droughts.140 Others move in the opposite
direction by authorizing emergency withdrawal permits or alternative
supply sources to augment supplies during drought,141 and some
increase the flexibility of water users to engage in willing transfers of
water rights during droughts.142 States also vary in their philosophies
about whether drought-related shortages should be borne equally among
users or should reflect policy-based use priorities. Texas, for example,
requires pro rata reductions during drought—that is, no preference
among users.143 Iowa, by contrast, provides a statutory hierarchy for
allocating water during drought, enforced through sequential
prohibitions on water uses by category,144 while Pennsylvania has the
authority to prohibit nonessential water use during droughts.145
The choice among different approaches to modifying water rights
reflects competing policy goals, but with implications for the resulting
balance between compassion and risk. For example, provisions that
facilitate water transfers provide incentives to use water more efficiently
139. See Najarian, supra note 121, at 68–71 (but noting inadequate knowledge of plan
implementation).
140. See, e.g., TEX. SPEC. DISTS. CODE ANN. § 8802.109 (2010). But see id. § 8802.110
(banning all groundwater uses during extreme droughts, but providing exception for human
consumption to protect health, welfare, and safety).
141. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-408 (1997); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-166-010(2),
173-166-070 (2011).
142. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-83-104 to -106 (West 2004); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 173-166-010(2)(b), 173-166-080 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.83B.410 (West 2007).
143. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.039 (West 2008).
144. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.266(1)(c) (West 2004). Restrictions may be imposed in
sequence to: (1) interstate water transfers; (2) water for primarily recreational activities; (3)
irrigation water for commodity crops such as “hay, corn, soybeans, oats, grain, sorghum[,] or
wheat;” (4) water for manufacturing or industrial use; (5) water used to generate electricity; (6)
water for livestock production; and (7) water for various sources of human consumption. Id.
§ 455B.266(2).
145. See 4 PA. CODE § 119.4 (2011) (prohibiting uses such as watering outdoor
landscaping, washing paved surfaces or equipment, filling swimming pools, and any other
“nonessential” use).
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to free up a salable commodity, while simultaneously allocating water
more efficiently in times of scarcity. A drought-neutral approach in
which shortages are borne pro rata operates like the traditional riparian
rights system,146 in which users presumably have an incentive to
conserve if sufficient supplies remain to support uses, but with
considerable uncertainty depending on the length and severity of the
resulting cutbacks. Use-based reductions operate like the seniority
approach in the prior appropriation system.147 High priority users have
few incentives to save because they will get their share under all but the
most severe conditions, and low priority users have little incentive to
save because their uses are likely to be eliminated first. Unlike the prior
appropriation system, however, use priorities based on legislative
judgments at least reflect a policy judgment as to which water uses are
most important during drought.
A second common mitigation strategy is to require or encourage
water suppliers and users to prepare and implement drought emergency
plans or water conservation plans as a condition of state water rights or
water use permits.148 To some extent, such strategies shift key decisions
about balancing relief and risk reduction “downstream” to water
providers and users, and the nature of that balance may depend on the
strategies chosen. States may require water users and providers to
identify or implement water conservation or other use reduction
methods,149 or to plan for alternative or augmented water supplies.150
Such strategies are inherently designed to reduce drought
vulnerability.151
146. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
148. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-342(A), 45-342(I) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-60-126(2)(a) (West 2010) (requiring covered entities to create, publicize, and implement a
plan by which to encourage customers to use water efficiently, and allowing other state or local
government entities to develop and use such plans); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-733(a) (1997)
(authorizing the chief engineer to require water user permits to include conservation plans and
practices when they will “promote public interest”); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 7:19-2.14(a)(10),
7:19-6.5(a)(3), 7:19-7.3(b)(3) (2011); 4 PA. CODE §§ 118.4(a)(1), 118.5(a) (2011); TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 36.113(c)(7) (West 2008) (allowing districts to require that a drought contingency
plan be included in the permit or permit amendment application for a well); TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. § 11.1272(a) (West 2008) (requiring public water suppliers and irrigation districts to have
drought contingency plans consistent with regional water policies); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 21.0121 (West 2004) (requiring drought contingency plan in water rights application).
149. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-716, 46-708 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 7:19-6.5 (2011); 4 PA. CODE § 120.4 (2011); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.1272 (West 2008).
150. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-342(I)(3) (2010); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:1911.2(a)(1)(i) (2011).
151. States also use a menagerie of other mitigation strategies. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-60-126.5 (West 2010) (drought mitigation planning); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2105
(West 2008) (creating the Department of Emergency Management, which is responsible for
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B. Federal Law and Policy
1. Federal Water Law and Policy
Because water resources allocation in the United States is left largely
to the states,152 there is no single, coherent body of federal water law.
There is, however, a long history of federal investment and water
project construction that drives water resources development, especially
in the West and the Midwest. In addition, various sources of federal law
govern water rights and allocation for particular parties or in specific
geographic locations. Although none of those sources of federal water
law is directed at drought per se, some have drought-specific provisions,
and each has varying degrees of influence on the balance between
compassion and risk in federal, state, and private drought response.
a. Federal Water Resource Development
Through laws such as the Reclamation Act of 1902153 and the Water
Resources Development Act,154 the federal government has supported a
massive system of dams and other water projects built and operated by
the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and
regional entities such as the Bonneville Power Authority and the
Tennessee Valley Authority. Through the Federal Power Act of 1920,155
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licenses a similarly
significant set of non-federal water projects.156
preparing and maintaining a state disaster plan); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-105(2)(a)
(West 2005); id. § 18-13-109(2)(a) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1414(b) (1997)
(relaxation of weather modification regulations); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:19-9.3(a) (2011) (water
surcharges); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1109(b) (West 2008); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1451 (West
2003); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.509(a) (West 2008) (temporary allowance of otherwise
unlawful waste discharges to augment stream flows); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 352.081(c)
(West 2005) (permitting the prohibition or restriction of outdoor burning); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.83B.405 (West 2007) (public communication and education regarding drought
conditions).
152. See supra Section II.A (outlining what modifications to state water law are warranted
as a means of adaption to drought). In the eastern United States, where there is little federal
land, states have always governed water rights and allocation through the common law and later
statutory and regulatory versions of the riparian rights doctrine. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL.,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES, CASES AND MATERIALS 27 (4th ed. 2006). In the West,
the Supreme Court recognized, through a confusing evolution of cases, that Congress severed
water rights from federal land holdings through statutes such as the Mining Act of 1866, leaving
water rights to allocation under state law. See id. at 331–35; Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935).
153. Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1903) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
43 U.S.C. (2006)).
154. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2201–22 (2006).
155. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–823d (2006).
156. See Adler, supra note 97, at 1019–23.
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Statutes governing federal water project construction or licensing do
not establish federal drought policy per se. At most, they articulate
general principles of water resource management,157 with delegation of
authority over project management to federal program officials.
Moreover, Congress has consistently subjected implementation of those
federal laws to applicable state water law,158 except where state law
conflicts with an express requirement of the federal statute.159 In that
sense, federal water resource development statutes could be viewed as
drought-neutral: the federal role is simply to provide or facilitate water
infrastructure, with key decisions about water and drought left to state
law.
However, federal decisions about project funding, approval, and
operation can significantly influence drought management and impacts.
Federally built or licensed water projects provide significant storage
capacity that helps buffer regions from the effects of meteorological
drought, thus reducing vulnerability. On the other hand, that
infrastructure arguably stimulates water use in regions with limited
water supply, particularly when federal subsidies distort decisions about
the economic benefits and risks of water use.160 Irrigation confers
significant benefits in terms of food production,161 and water storage
and conveyance support urban growth and development in regions
where many people want to live.162 However, artificially high water use
can increase vulnerability if reservoir storage runs short during a
protracted drought, especially if climate disruption reduces precipitation
beyond the range assumed when projects were built, for example, in the
Colorado River Basin.163 Decisions about additional storage capacity to
157. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 390b, 411, 485h (2006) (providing for use of Reclamation Act
project water for utilitarian uses, such as irrigation, municipal and industrial water supply,
electric power, navigation, and flood control); id. § 372 (providing for beneficial use as the
“basis, the measure, and the limit” to the right to Reclamation Act project water); 16 U.S.C.
§ 803(a) (2006) (providing for Federal Power Act licensing of water projects that are “best
adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway”).
158. See Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2006); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 821
(2006).
159. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 647, 675–79 (1978) (upholding state
conditions if consistent with provisions in federal act). But see First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop.
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 170–71 (1946) (holding that state water permit is not
needed as prerequisite to Federal Power Act license, so long as water is returned to stream
without harmful diminution).
160. See generally RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES,
PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1989) (discussing the inefficient use of
federal water use subsidies); Mark Kanazawa, Pricing Subsidies and Economic Efficiency: The
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 36 J.L. & ECON. 205 (1993) (same).
161. See PEREIRA ET AL., supra note 7, at 18 (noting that irrigated agriculture consumes
about one-sixth of all arable land but produces 40% of the world’s crops).
162. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 88, at 5.
163. See Martin Hoerling & Jon Eischeid, Past Peak Water in the Southwest, SW.
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deal with future drought will either be made by federal agencies, or will
be subject to federal licensing or permitting.164 Moreover, the federal
role does not end once water projects are built. Despite the fact that
federal water project operation is typically subject to state water law and
therefore requires acquisition of state water rights,165 federal officials
make key decisions about use and allocation of federal project water,166
including during droughts.167
Federal decisions regarding water project construction and operation
are also subject to federal environmental statutes, which may also play a
role in drought policy. For example, federal decisions about dam
construction, operation, and management may be subject to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).168 If an environmental impact
statement (EIS) is required, the agency must study and reveal
reasonably foreseeable environmental project impacts, alternatives to
the action and comparative impacts, and potential mitigation.169 The
Endangered Species Act (ESA)170 may have an even greater impact on
drought response where Section 7 consultation171 requires water from
HYDROLOGY, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 18; N. Christensen & D.P. Lettenmaier, A Multimodel
Ensemble Approach to Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on the Hydrology of the
Colorado River Basin, 3 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI. DISCUSSIONS 3727, 3748–49 (2006);
Gregory J. McCabe & David M. Wolock, Warming May Create Substantial Water Supply
Shortages in the Colorado River Basin, GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS (Nov. 27, 2007), at 1,
3–4, available at http://www.agu.org/pubs/crossref/2007/2007GL031764.shtml; Richard Seager
et al., Model Projections of an Imminent Transition to a More Arid Climate in Southwestern
North America, 316 SCIENCE 1181, 1181–84 (2007).
164. See James City Cnty., Va. v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330, 1331–32, 1339 (4th Cir. 1993)
(upholding EPA veto of county water supply project on environmental grounds); Adler, supra
note 17, at 55–57.
165. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261, 1263–64, 1273 (E.D.N.C.
1990) (reviewing Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to allow pipeline diverting water from
Corps reservoir for municipal water supply).
167. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 2212 (2006) (authorizing temporary water supplies from federal
reclamation projects to alleviate water shortages during drought, free from regular ownership,
acreage, or pricing restrictions of Reclamation Act); South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d
1014, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding Army Corps of Engineers’ decisions regarding reservoir
releases during period of drought).
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70f (2006). NEPA is almost invariably triggered by federal
decisions regarding water project construction, funding, licensing, or permitting. See SAX ET AL.,
supra note 152, at 668 (commenting that virtually all federal water projects will constitute major
federal action subject to NEPA).
169. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) (discussing the situations in which an
EIS is necessary); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.12–1502.16 (2010) (setting forth EIS requirements).
170. 16 U.S.C. § 1531–1544 (2006).
171. See id. § 1536 (requiring federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior
(or the Secretary of Commerce for marine species) to ensure that federal action does not
jeopardize the continued existence of any listed threatened or endangered species, or destroy or
adversely modify habitat critical to the support of those species). ESA consultation requirements
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federal projects to be devoted to species and habitat protection rather
than irrigation, municipal or industrial water supply, or other off stream
human uses during drought.172
Because federal water project decisions are subject to discretion by
different agencies within highly variable contexts, it is difficult to
discern a uniform “policy” as to how they affect drought management.
However, both NEPA and the ESA require agencies to evaluate
alternatives that might minimize impacts on the environment or on
threatened or endangered species and their habitat.173 That analysis
provides the informational framework and legal support for agencies to
choose between competing drought management strategies and goals.
Stored federal project water might be used to provide drought relief to
users who might otherwise have to curtail their uses and activities,
potentially encouraging inefficiency in the long run. Alternatively,
agencies might reduce vulnerability by conditioning water availability
on the implementation of water efficiency measures.174 An oftoverlooked requirement of NEPA is that agencies must consider “the
relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.”175 An
approach that exalts short-term uses might focus on immediate drought
relief, whereas one that focuses more on long-term productivity might
promote efforts to reduce vulnerability.
One example is the Bureau of Reclamation’s guidelines governing
operation of the Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams given current and
may also be triggered by ongoing operational decisions. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring ESA consultation for water
contract renewals); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138
F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233, 1251 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (requiring ESA consultation for annual
operating plan).
172. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d
1082, 1084–85, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (invalidating ESA action for insufficient flows for
endangered fish); Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195–96, 1211 (D. Or. 2001)
(upholding operating plan as necessary to protect fish); Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and
Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 197, 212–14 (2002) (describing Section 7 duties); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish,
Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 283–84 (2003)
(discussing the closing of the Klamath Project headgates, which halted irrigation deliveries in an
effort to protect endangered fish).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2006) (requiring agencies to evaluate in an EIS
alternatives to the proposed action); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2010) (same); 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(b)(3)(A) (2006) (requiring consideration of “reasonable and prudent alternatives” that
would not jeopardize species and their habitats).
174. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(f) (2010) (requiring an EIS to consider “[n]atural or
depletable resource requirements and conservation potential of various alternatives and
mitigation measures”).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv) (2006).
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predicted shortages in the Colorado River Basin.176 Guided by an EIS
process177 and a negotiated agreement by the Colorado River Basin
States,178 the “interim” guidelines179 specify reservoir elevations for
Lake Powell and Lake Mead that dictate prescribed water delivery
reductions.180 However, the guidelines also encourage water
conservation and allow storage of the resulting savings in the reservoirs
free from the “use it or lose it” provisions of prior appropriation.181 Two
aspects of the guidelines stand out as mechanisms that can motivate risk
reduction while still providing for some relief in the event of severe
drought. First, by providing quantitative clarity regarding reservoir
levels at which specified reductions will occur,182 the guidelines
establish clear signals by which water users can make decisions about
water use and efficiency. Second, rather than simply providing free
water from federal storage in the event of drought, the provisions tie
drought relief to earlier efforts to generate surplus through conservation
or augmentation of water supplies.183
b. Federal Law Governing Water Rights and Allocation
There is also no integrated body of federal law governing water
rights and allocation by which to guide federal drought policy.
However, several sources of federal law affect water rights in specific
applications. Those sources include the federal reserved water rights
doctrine governing Indian reservations and other reserved federal
lands,184 federal statutes,185 congressionally approved interstate
176. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER
BASIN SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD 1, 2
(2007) [hereinafter COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SHORTAGE GUIDELINES], available at
www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf.
177. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT: COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND
COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD, at ES-1 (2007), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/FEIS/index.html (explaining the EIS process
and guidelines).
178. Law of the River, CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT, http://www.cap-az.com/AboutUs/
LawOfTheRiver.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (stating that the Basin States signed an
agreement concerning the Colorado river management and operations on April 23, 2007).
179. Although the guidelines are not permanent, they are designed to remain in effect until
2025 for water supply decisions and 2026 for reservoir operating decisions, a relatively long
time for such policies. See COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SHORTAGE GUIDELINES, supra note 176,
at 4.
180. See COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SHORTAGE GUIDELINES, supra note 176, at 33–59.
181. The specific mechanism is called “Intentionally Created Surplus.” See id.
182. Id. at 33–59 (detailing the process for providing drought relief to the Colorado River
Basin Area).
183. See id. at 38–39 (describing categories of ICS).
184. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978) (national forests);
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compacts,186 and Supreme Court decisions and decrees187 governing
allocation of specific interstate waters.188 By and large, federal law
either protects federal property or resource interests, or fulfills the
federal role in resolving interstate water disputes. To the extent that
these goals are independent of drought policy, this piecemeal body of
federal water law is drought-neutral. However, given that federal
intervention into state water allocation decisions has the greatest
significance during times of scarcity,189 federal water law can affect the
balance between relief-based and risk-reduction approaches to drought.
i. Federal Reserved Water Rights
The federal reserved water rights doctrine casts a “cloud” over the
state prior appropriation doctrine,190 with an uncertain impact on the
manner in which other water users perceive and respond to drought risk.
Federal reserved water rights consist of water that the federal
government, pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause191
and the Property Clause,192 impliedly reserved to support the uses for
which particular federal lands were set aside from the general public

Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131, 147 (1976) (national monuments); Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (Indian reservations, national recreation areas, national
forests, and national wildlife refuges); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565–66 (1908)
(Indian reservations).
185. E.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617–17t (2006) (allocating lower
Colorado River among states in the lower Colorado River Basin, as determined in Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. at 564–65).
186. E.g., Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 324 (1928), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-12a2 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-61-101 (West 2011); Delaware River Basin
Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961); Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L.
No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
187. E.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 551, 589–90 (1963) (referring to the
Colorado River); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907) (referring to the Arkansas River).
188. The federal government also plays an obvious role in international water disputes, but
this analysis is limited to domestic law.
189. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
190. See SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 941. The federal reserved water rights doctrine has
far more impact on prior appropriation states because the vast majority of federal land holdings
are in the West. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 n.3 (1978). But see Hope
M. Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions: Water, Water
Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203 (2006) (arguing for tribes
in the East to receive same riparian rights as those in the West); Jeremy N. Jungreis, “Permit”
Me Another Drink: A Proposal for Safeguarding the Water Rights of Federal Lands in the
Regulated Riparian East, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2005) (claiming that consumption in
the East has also increased as water supplies decrease).
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
192. Id. art. IV, § 3.
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domain.193 Because the priority date for federal reserved rights is based
on the date the reservation was established,194 in many cases those
rights have priority over other uses under the “first in time, first in
right” tenet of the prior appropriation doctrine.195 Moreover, federal
reserved rights are not subject to the “use it or lose it” requirement of
prior appropriation law.196 Many federal reserved rights have not been
quantified; they might be quite substantial relative to other uses and
water rights, or they may not be in actual use or might consist of
instream uses that are not transparent to other users absent a legal claim
of priority.
In theory, uncertainties in federal reserved rights could cause other
water users to exercise caution about inefficient water use for fear that
those uses would be reduced or eliminated by senior reserved rights
during a drought. In reality, however, this potential efficiency incentive
is counterbalanced by incentives in the prior appropriation doctrine.
Given the tendency toward complacency during times of plenty, water
users are more likely to use as much of the resource as they can absent
an actual challenge. Moreover, because users are subject to statutory
forfeiture or common law abandonment if they do not use their full
appropriative rights,197 and because the prohibition against waste is
enforced ineffectively at best,198 prior appropriation doctrine prevents
the latent pendency of federal reserved rights from serving as a
significant incentive for efficiency. This dynamic might shift if the
federal and state governments improved or expedited efforts to quantify
federal reserved water rights through general stream adjudications,199
statutory settlements, or otherwise. Although the “use it or lose it”
mentality of nonfederal water users would likely persist even in the face
of quantification when resources are sufficient, at least those users
would be on notice of the risks they face when supplies diminish during
drought.

193. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
194. See id. But see United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the priority date for Indian reserved right was “time immemorial” based on aboriginal water
rights).
195. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
196. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600, 601 (holding that reserved rights are
intended to meet both present and future needs).
197. See SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 247–64.
198. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
199. See 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970) (subjecting United States to jurisdiction of state court in
adjudications of rights to stream systems). For examples of such adjudications, see In re Gen.
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source, 989 P.2d 739,
744 (Ariz. 1999); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76, 84–86 (Wyo. 1988).
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Federal reserved water rights also provide mixed incentives for risk
reduction by federal water users. Federal reserved rights are quantified
relative to the amount of water necessary to fulfill the primary purpose
of the reservation.200 Quantification based entirely on demand, rather
than a balancing of supply and demand under a range of hydrological
circumstances, provides incentives for federal users to overstate their
needs in order to maximize their quantified water rights. However, the
Supreme Court has somewhat curtailed this tendency by clarifying that
the doctrine “reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation, no more.”201 Nonfederal water users might
argue that this standard demands that federal users base their claims on
efficient methods of water use. Ironically, however, it is difficult for
non-federal users to argue that federal claimants must be more efficient
than they are. Efforts to reconcile inchoate federal reserved rights with
existing water rights and uses could force all users to evaluate efficiency
improvements that might reduce drought vulnerability.
ii. Federal Resolution of Interstate Water Disputes
A range of legal tools is used to resolve interstate water conflicts by
varying institutions at different times and to address different issues.
Therefore, these legal tools are not likely to reflect a coherent or
consistent drought policy. Resolutions are likely to be drought-neutral if
they simply allocate water among competing users regardless of
hydrological conditions. However, federal intervention in interstate
water disputes can provide positive or negative incentives for reducing
drought vulnerability.
The law of equitable apportionment, under which the Supreme Court
resolves interstate water disputes202 absent a compact or other direct
agreement, has the potential to stimulate efforts to reduce drought
vulnerability, but the Court’s infrequent and tepid application of this
doctrine has minimized that potential thus far. In deciding
apportionment among states, the Court considers, among other factors,
“the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas.”203
Moreover, while priority is the “guiding principle” in interstate
allocation disputes between two prior appropriation states, the Court
considers other factors, such as available conservation methods and the
balance of harms between states.204 In theory, judicial inquiry into the
200. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701–02 (1978).
201. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
202. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over cases and controversies between
states. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 518 (1906).
203. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
204. Colorado v. New Mexico (I), 459 U.S. 176, 183–84, 188 (1982) (quoting Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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efficiency of water use by competing states should provide incentives
for efforts to improve efficiency and hence to reduce drought
vulnerability.
Unfortunately, two aspects of the Court’s equitable-apportionment
jurisprudence have limited the effectiveness of this incentive. First, the
Court has declined to resolve interstate water disputes absent interstate
impacts of a “serious magnitude.”205 This tendency reflects, in part, the
Court’s reluctance to interfere with state control over water resources
and perhaps an intentional judicial incentive for states to resolve water
disputes through negotiation rather than litigation. However, the effect
is to defer key decisions until impacts have already occurred, rather than
adopting or requiring preventive measures to reduce risk. Second, the
Court declined to provide relief in Colorado v. New Mexico—the most
significant equitable-apportionment case in which the Court actually
examined water efficiency. Overruling findings by a Special Master, the
Court held that Colorado did not meet a strict “clear and convincing
evidence” standard to prove inefficient water use in New Mexico.206
Arguably, the Court simply followed the reluctance of western states to
curtail traditional existing water uses in determining waste or
inefficiency. But the Court’s weak scrutiny provides little incentive for
states to promote sustainable water use and management to reduce
drought vulnerability for themselves and neighboring states.207
Interstate water compacts are not likely to reflect a considered
federal drought policy because, despite requiring congressional
approval,208 the compacts more likely reflect interstate negotiation than
federal policy. Congress has no incentive to disturb those judgments
absent an inappropriate impact on non-signatory states or countervailing
federal interests.209
Some interstate water compacts reflect a largely drought-neutral
approach, that is, they might envision drought and even allocate the risk
of drought among the party states, but then leave decisions about
resulting shortages either to individual states within the apportionments
205. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907) (stating that although Colorado had
diminished the flow of water into Kansas, Kansas had not made out a case entitling it to a decree
for relief; such relief could come at a time in the future when an equitable division of benefits no
longer existed); see also SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 868–71 (noting that the Supreme Court
has only actually issued apportionment decrees in three cases).
206. Colorado v. New Mexico (II), 467 U.S. 310, 312, 316–20 (1984).
207. See id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion provided
little incentive for states to improve efficiency of water use and management to accommodate
uses in neighboring states).
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting states from entering into compacts “without
the Consent of Congress”).
209. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518–21 (1893) (requiring congressional
consent when a compact might increase state power at the expense of the federal government).
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negotiated in the agreement or to future resolution. The Colorado River
Compact, for example, assigns the risk of drought to the Upper Basin.210
Although it apportions fixed rights to beneficial consumptive use
between the Upper and Lower Basins,211 the Compact prohibits the
states primarily situated in the Upper Basin (or the “Upper Division”212)
from causing flows at Lee Ferry to fall below levels necessary to meet
the Lower Basin’s full apportionment on a ten-year rolling average,213
thus placing any risk of loss on the Upper Basin. This allocation of
drought risk reflected a quid pro quo, in return for which the Upper
Division states were freed from enforcement of the prior appropriation
doctrine given far more rapid growth in the Lower Basin, especially in
California.214 The potentially perverse result is that the Upper Division
states would have far greater incentives than the Lower Division states
to reduce drought vulnerability. On the other hand, the tension created
within the Compact, and perhaps the aversion to expensive and
protracted litigation that would be required for the Lower Division to
enforce its Compact rights against the Upper Division, generated
sufficient incentives for the states and the federal government to
negotiate the interim shortage guidelines discussed earlier.215
Other interstate compacts, notably the Delaware River Basin
Compact216 and the Susquehanna River Basin Compact,217 address
drought management more directly but without significant guidance.
The Delaware Compact establishes the interstate Delaware River Basin
Commission (DRBC),218 which has authority to allocate basin waters

210. The Compact divides the basin between lands draining into the river above and below
Lee Ferry. The Upper Basin includes portions of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming; the Lower Basin includes portions of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Utah. Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 325 (1928).
211. The Compact apportions 7.5 maf (million acre feet) of beneficial consumptive use
annually to each basin, plus up to an additional one maf to the lower basin if available from
lower basin tributaries. Id. at 325; see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 572–74
(interpreting the Boulder Canyon Project Act and the Compact as attributing the additional one
maf to water from lower basin tributaries).
212. From a geopolitical and implementation or enforcement perspective, the Compact
defines the Upper Division states as Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, and the
Lower Division states as Arizona, California, and Nevada. Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong.
Rec. 325 (1928).
213. Id.
214. See ADLER, supra note 88, at 21 (describing California’s growth in light of its water
rights).
215. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text.
216. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688, 700 (1961)
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D (2011)); 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 815.101 (2011).
217. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 820.1 (2011).
218. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D-7 (2011).
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equitably and proportionally219 and unusually broad authority over basin
water management generally.220 As part of this authority, the
Commission has the power to declare drought emergencies and
accompanying increases or decreases in water allocations, diversions, or
releases as necessary to address drought conditions.221 However, aside
from public hearing requirements,222 the Compact provides no
definition of what constitutes a drought or requirements regarding how
the Commission’s drought emergency powers should be exercised.
Some commentators argue that this bare bones approach is the
Compact’s strength because of its “flexible, cooperative, planningoriented structure,”223 while others suggest that the approach is designed
to leave drought management largely to member states “as long as the
state agency acts consistently with commission drought management
plans.”224 An alternative view is that the states entrusted drought and
water management decisions to the Commission because its
composition fully represents and protects each state’s interests,225
although the process has seen controversy and threats of litigation.226
Regardless of the explanation, the Commission has adopted risk
reduction strategies for drought in two key respects. First, the
Commission has defined the “drought of record” to provide notice about
what will trigger a drought emergency and what should be used for
dependable water supply planning,227 as well as phased reductions tied
to particular conditions and geographic areas, and accompanying
priorities for use reductions.228 Second, to reduce drought vulnerability
219. See id. § 32:11D-16.
220. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States
and the Struggle Over the Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 844 (2005) (stating that the
Compact confers an unusually expansive water management authority to the Delaware River
Basin Commission); see also SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 854 (describing Delaware River
Basin Commission as “one of the most powerful regional agencies ever created,” with “broad
powers to control all water uses in the basin”).
221. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D-16 (2011).
222. See id. § 32:11D-54.
223. Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States, 12 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 115, 134 (2004).
224. Steven T. Miano & Michael T. Crane, Eastern Water Law: Historical Perspectives
and Emerging Trends, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 14, 18 (2003).
225. The Commission includes one representative from each of the four basin states and
one U.S. commissioner appointed by the President. Delaware River Basin Compact, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 32:11D-8. A majority vote is needed to change water allocation, ensuring that all states
are protected fully under drought and other conditions. Id. § 32:11D-11.
226. See SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 854–55 (describing actions by New York to defy
Supreme Court decree during 1960s drought and Pennsylvania threat of renewed Supreme Court
litigation during early 1980s drought).
227. The Commission identified the drought of record by reference to the 1961–67
drought. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21 §§ 890.85–90.86 (2011).
228. See id. §§ 890.8–90.12.
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in advance, the Commission requires water users to maximize
efficiency and to adopt and implement water conservation and
contingency plans in order to further reduce freshwater use during
droughts.229
The comprehensive, interstate commission approach to water
management in the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Compacts
reflects a rare application of regional, watershed-based river and water
management that was advocated for many years in the United States and
manifested most clearly in the Water Resources Planning Act of
1965,230 but that has been abandoned as a nationwide initiative.231 The
Delaware River Basin experience and the Colorado River drought
shortage guidelines suggest that cooperative approaches to resolving
interstate water disputes provide opportunities to reduce drought
vulnerability through advance planning and management. By
comparison, resolving disputes through litigation or otherwise, once
drought has already occurred, is likely to generate reactive rather than
preventive drought policies. It would be wise to develop similar
comprehensive commissions like those established by the Compacts in
other parts of the country that are likely to face increased drought risk
due to climate disruption.
2. Federal Drought and Agricultural Law and Policy
Just as states have adopted drought legislation to augment state water
law, the federal government has adopted drought laws and policies
independent of or integrated into federal water law and policy only to a
limited degree. Conversely, federal drought law and policy is linked
very closely to U.S. agricultural law and policy. Therefore, the manner
in which the federal government has addressed tradeoffs between
drought relief and risk reduction can best be understood in the context
of the historical co-evolution of federal drought and agricultural law.
a. Federal Laissez-Faire Policy Before the New Deal
Until the 1930s, drought and other disaster relief was left largely to
nongovernmental organizations; those who made unsound risk decisions
that could not be remedied through the private market went bankrupt
and moved to other places in search of new livelihoods.232 In 1887,
President Grover Cleveland vetoed federal legislation appropriating
$10,000 to provide seeds to drought-stricken Texas as unconstitutional,
asserting: “Though the people support the government, the government
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id. §§ 833.5-A(a), 890.4
Pub. L. No. 89-80, 79 Stat. 244 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1962).
See Adler, supra note 97, at 1012–13 (noting that the Act was defunded in the 1980s).
See THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 2–6.
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should not support the people.”233 Under this laissez-faire philosophy,
only farmers who made sound risk decisions (as to what crops to plant,
when, and where, and how much to borrow for mortgages, equipment,
and supplies) continued to operate. However, this approach resulted in
significant human suffering and economic dislocation, due to extremely
high bankruptcy and foreclosure rates in the Great Plains and
elsewhere.234 Farmers who settled areas with unpredictable weather
took enormous risks to feed and clothe the nation but also bore the full
consequences of those risks when the weather and economy turned
bad.235
The first significant federal drought relief came during World War I,
but remained focused on self-sufficiency. During 1918 and 1919,
President Woodrow Wilson authorized $5 million per year for seed
loans to farmers who lost two successive crops to drought and winter
frosts.236 Although farm organizations sought more significant federal
assistance during the 1920s, legislation either failed in Congress or was
vetoed.237 President Herbert Hoover first sought relief from private
organizations,238 and in 1930, he approved federal aid of a “self-help”
variety, such as crop production and feed-and-seed loans secured only

233. Id. at 4; H.W. BRANDS, TRAITOR TO HIS CLASS: THE PRIVILEGED LIFE AND RADICAL
PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 237 (2008); LOWELL K. DYSON, HISTORY OF
FEDERAL DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAMS 1 (1988). The Texas Legislature, however, appropriated
$100,000 that year for drought relief in the form of food and seed grain. See THE HISTORY OF
DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 4. Other states, such as Kansas and Nebraska, also spent
small amounts on drought relief during this period, but the Governor of Colorado vetoed
drought relief in 1894. See id. Of course, at least since the Reclamation Act of 1902, Pub. L. No.
57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.), the U.S.
government has provided subsidized water for irrigation and other uses, but to promote
development rather than relieve drought. See supra note 160; Adler, supra note 97, at 1015–19
(discussing the Reclamation Act of 1902); U.S. CONGRESS, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW
FEDERAL POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF WATER 11 (2006) [hereinafter HOW FEDERAL
POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF WATER] (calculating the magnitude of federal water
subsidies). Of course, additional storage capacity can help buffer the effects of drought,
especially in arid regions. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 5.
234. See supra Subsection I.C.1.
235. Id.
236. See DYSON, supra note 233, at 1. The federal government authorized similarly modest
amounts for regional drought relief through the early 1920s. See id. (describing appropriations
for seed loans to farmers in the west).
237. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, AGRICULTURE
INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 485: HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT
PROGRAMS, 1933–84, at 1–3 (1984) [hereinafter HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS].
238. Even the Red Cross had to amend its charter to provide drought relief. Previously, the
Red Cross could only respond to an “Act of God,” which it did not define to include drought.
See THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 5.
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by a first lien on the crops produced.239 Although the Secretary of
Agriculture had sole discretion to determine when drought relief was
warranted, funding was so low that farmer risk decisions could be
subsidized only in extreme situations. Moreover, the 1930 Act provided
loans, rather than grants or relief payments. While helpful to farmers
who lacked sufficient capital reserves when revenues from droughtstricken crops fell, repayment requirements still required farmers to
internalize the risk of planting a new crop if drought conditions
remained. However, the federal government subsidized those risk
decisions by limiting the required loan security to a first lien on the
crops grown. Drought exacerbated but was not the only source of
volatility in production and prices in an inherently risky sector of the
economy. Perhaps as a result, the “‘self-help’ approach used by the
Hoover administration represents the last attempt by a U.S. [P]resident
to address drought relief problems through voluntary measures.”240
b. The New Deal Legacy of Compassion and Risk-Spreading
As the drought and depression intensified, and prompted by the
substantially different philosophy of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Administration, the United States abandoned its laissez-faire approach
to drought. Instead, the federal government distributed the risk of
drought across society through programs designed to provide
emergency response and relief.241 Those measures included government
funding or other assistance for supplemental water supply, subsidized
feed or other agricultural inputs, subsidized crop insurance, and direct
relief payments.242
New Deal agricultural policies also responded to underlying
problems in agricultural markets, which were exacerbated but not
caused by drought. During World War I, the government encouraged
farmers to produce as much as possible to meet international market
demand generated by reduced production in war-torn regions.243 When
those markets declined after the war, U.S. farmers continued to produce
in record quantities, resulting in surpluses, plummeting market prices,
239. See S.J. Res. 211, 71st Cong. (1930) (authorizing $45 million for loans to farmers in
areas affected by drought, storms, or hail, upon a finding of emergency conditions by the
Secretary of Agriculture, to purchase seed, fertilizer, feed, or fuel necessary to continue crop
production); THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 5–6.
240. THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 6; DYSON, supra note 233, at
2 (commenting that drought relief programs were almost always “inextricably mixed” with
programs for political reform and overall economic recovery).
241. See THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 4, 7–20.
242. See id.
243. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 109–11; THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra
note 11, at 41.
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and insufficient farm revenues to meet debt service and other needs.244
The main purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933245 was to
restore balance between agricultural supply and demand, and to
establish sufficient prices to reinstate the purchasing power of producers
of agricultural commodities246 relative to a base period immediately
prior to World War I.247 To balance supply and demand, the federal
government paid farmers to produce less and used proceeds from
commodity processing taxes to maintain prices and to purchase surplus
commodities in order to control supply.248 This reduced incentives for
debt-laden farmers to till more acreage, potentially on marginal soils, to
maximize revenue despite unfavorable conditions.249 However, guaranteed
federal payments also reduced the incentive for farmers to reevaluate
the risk of continuing production in drought-stricken regions.
Congress did not originally intend for this unprecedented federal
intervention into agricultural markets to continue beyond the Great
Depression.250 But as the drought of the 1930s intensified,251 leading to
244. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 122–26; HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT
note 237, at 1.
245. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933)
[hereinafter 1933 Act]. Portions of this legislation were declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936), but were largely replaced by
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).
246. The 1933 Act defined “basic agricultural commodity” to include wheat, cotton, field
corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk and milk products. 1933 Act, § 11. In 1934, Congress added
beef and dairy cattle, peanuts, rye, flax, barley, and grain sorghums. Pub. L. No. 73-142, 48 Stat.
528 (1934).
247. 1933 Act, § 2(1). The base period was defined as August 1909 to July 1914 for all
crops except tobacco, and the decade immediately following the war (August 1919 to July 1929)
for tobacco. Id. This concept later became known as “parity,” and the base period against which
commodity prices are measured remains essentially the same today. 7 U.S.C. § 1301 (2011)
(baseline period for parity calculation of January 1910 to December 1914 for everything but
tobacco and a baseline period of August 1919 to July 1929 for tobacco); see HISTORY OF
AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 3.
248. 1933 Act, § 8(1). The Act provided for similar agreements with processors, handlers,
and others involved in the marketing or distribution of agricultural commodities. Id. § 8(2). The
core provisions of the 1933 Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into production
agreements in which the federal government would make “rental or benefit payments” to
commodity producers in return for their agreement to reduce acreage planted, production, or
both, and accompanying authority to levy (or rebate) processing taxes on the first level of
commodity processing, tied to amounts determined to match the market price for the commodity
to the purchasing power for that commodity during the (Pre-World War I) parity period. Id.
§§ 8–9.
249. Voluntary efforts by farm organizations to control production in order to stabilize
prices has been unsuccessful since the 1920s. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT
AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 1.
250. The 1933 Act included a sunset provision triggered “whenever the President finds and
proclaims that the national economic emergency in relation to agriculture has been ended . . . .”
1933 Act, § 13.
AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra
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the intense human suffering of the Dust Bowl,252 Congress continued to
respond with massive emergency funding for disaster loans and other
relief programs.253 Following the 1936 Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Butler, which invalidated the tax provisions of the 1933
Act,254 Congress modified its intervention into the agricultural economy
in the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936.255 The
1936 Act established a precedent for using agricultural law to protect
soil, water, and other environmental resources while also continuing
efforts to control excess production by removing acreage from
production.256 Unlike its initial, temporary intervention into the
agricultural economy, however, Congress established long-term
institutions to implement the 1936 Act257 and linked the soil
conservation program to the Agricultural Adjustment Act.258 Moreover,
the soil conservation law directed the Secretary of Agriculture to
expand domestic and foreign markets and to dispose of surplus
commodities.259 These linkages made it difficult to decouple federal
agricultural and conservation policy.
The Soil Conservation Act failed to curtail production sufficiently to
maintain prices,260 leading Congress to pass the Agricultural

251. “In 1934 . . . 1,457 counties in every State west of the Mississippi, except
Washington, plus Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan, were designated as droughtstricken.” DYSON, supra note 233, at 2; see also DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11 (describing
extent and severity of drought from 1930–36).
252. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 11 (detailing the plight of the farmer during the
Dust Bowl); THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11 (same).
253. See, e.g., Emergency Appropriations Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-412, 48 Stat. 1021,
1056 (1934) (appropriating $525 million for emergency loans to farmers for seed, feed, freight,
fallowing and similar purposes). Congress also expanded the Act to include other agricultural
products. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra
note 237, at 4–10 (describing a variety of relief efforts).
254. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–78 (1936).
255. Pub. L. No. 74-461, 49 Stat. 1148, 1148–52 (1936).
256. See id. § 7(a) (establishing a policy to preserve and improve soil fertility, to promote
the economic use and conservation of land, to reduce the waste of national soil resources, and to
protect rivers and harbors from soil erosion in order to protect navigability and to prevent
floods); id. §§ 8(b)–(c), 15 (authorizing up to $500 million a year for aid to farmers engaged in
approved soil conservation and restoration, erosion control, and similar practices).
257. See id. § 7(b)–(g) (establishing a system of cooperative federalism in which the
Secretary of Agriculture would approve and issue grants to eligible state programs to administer
the program).
258. See id. § 7(a) (referring to a goal of “maintenance of a continuous and stable supply of
agricultural commodities adequate to meet consumer demand at prices fair to both producers
and consumers”).
259. Id. § 12.
260. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra
note 237, at 11.
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Adjustment Act of 1938.261 The 1938 Act blended the loan-based parity
concept of the 1933 Act with the direct grant approach in the 1936
Act262 and added what would become a longstanding program of federal
crop insurance.263 The new law employed marketing quotas and
commodity reserve storage to help achieve supply and parity price
goals.264 Along with the Agricultural Act of 1949,265 the 1938 Act
remains the “default” policy absent periodic agricultural legislation
(“farm bills”) that override those provisions during specific periods.266
Several aspects of these new laws affect the balance between drought
relief and risk reduction.
The 1938 Act provided that soil conservation grants in “arid or
semiarid” regions (a term not defined in the statute) may include “water
conservation and the beneficial use of water on individual
farms . . . .”267 Although designed to promote efficient water use, these
grants facilitated investment in water storage and irrigation to develop
agriculture in regions that otherwise could not support it. Although
consistent with the Reclamation Act philosophy, this sent mixed signals
about the risks of operating in arid regions. Congress also directed the
Secretary of Agriculture to apportion funds based on acreage planted
over the preceding decade, adjusted for “abnormal weather conditions
and trends in acreage during the applicable period.”268 This method of
apportionment provided incentives to plant during unfavorable weather.
Payments were allotted based on the history of acreage seeded rather
than crop yield, making productivity less relevant than total acreage for
purposes of grant payments, and hence decisions about planting risk in
dry years. Similarly, because base production was adjusted to account
for abnormal weather, farmers could continue to plant in dry years
without fear of reduced future payments.269
261. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).
262. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra
note 237, at 12–15 (discussing the Act and its effects).
263. Pub. L. No. 75-430, §§ 501–18, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).
264. Id. §§ 311–56.
265. Pub. L. No. 81-439, 63 Stat. 1051 (1949).
266. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 577–79 (describing the 1938 Act and the 1949 Act as the
two key “[p]ermanent [p]rovisions” of U.S. agricultural law).
267. Pub. L. No. 75-430, § 101, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) (amending Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act § 8(b)).
268. Id. (amending Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act § 8(c)(1)).
Apportionment was based on the “acreage seeded for the production of the commodity during
the ten calendar years immediately preceding the calendar year in which the national acreage
allotment is determined . . . .” Id.
269. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 amended the Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act to account for abnormal weather as follows:
If, on account of drought, flood, insect pests, plant disease, or other
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The 1938 Act continued the parity philosophy of the 1933 Act, but
through loans and direct parity payments.270 The new Commodity
Credit Corporation administered the loans that, like those adopted
during the Hoover Administration, were secured entirely by the
crops.271 Those became known as “non-recourse loans” because the
government had no recourse on default other than selling the crops
pledged as collateral. Non-recourse loans allowed producers to sell their
crops, repay their loans, and retain the difference as profit; or if market
prices were low, to repay the loan with the crops pledged as collateral.
Adding to that risk subsidy, the Secretary of Agriculture compensated
producers for the difference between actual receipts and expected parity
prices.272 Because parity payments were “in addition to and not in
substitution for any other payments authorized by law,”273 a producer
could receive, for the same crop, direct conservation grants, loans
subsidized only by the crops produced, and parity payments. In the
aggregate, these programs significantly lowered the risk to farmers of
planting during droughts.
The Act also established an elaborate system of marketing quotas for
the five major commodity crops (tobacco, corn, wheat, cotton, and
rice).274 To prevent the indiscriminate dumping of commodities on the
market, which depressed prices and the agricultural economy generally,
Congress directed the Secretary to set quotas when supplies exceeded
prescribed amounts deemed “abnormally excessive.”275 Congress
explained that government quotas were necessary given production
volatility due to “natural causes” (including drought) and the inability of
large numbers of diversely located farmers to organize sufficiently in
order to limit production.276 In calculating quotas, however, drought and
other natural causes were taken into account in two converse ways.
First, “normal yield” was adjusted to account for “abnormal weather
uncontrollable natural cause, the yield in any year of such ten-year period is
less than 75 per centum of the average (computed without regard to such year),
such year shall be eliminated in calculating the normal yield per acre.
Id. (amending Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act § 8(c)(5)).
270. Id. §§ 302–03.
271. See id. § 302(h) (eliminating personal liability of producers beyond the sale of the
collateral absent fraudulent representations by the producer in obtaining a loan). Loans varied
depending on crops and price conditions relative to parity prices. See id. § 302(b)–(d). Over
time, Congress would amend parity levels repeatedly, often on a highly crop-specific basis,
depending on both economic conditions and shifting political factors. See HISTORY OF
AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 16–40.
272. Pub. L. No. 75-430, § 302, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).
273. Id. § 303.
274. Id. §§ 311–56.
275. See id.
276. See id. §§ 311, 321, 331, 341, 351.
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conditions,” and years in which yields were reduced significantly were
deleted.277 Second, in calculating “[r]eserve supply level[s],” increments
were added to guard against shortages caused by droughts, floods, or
other conditions.278 Thus, although Congress authorized quotas to
prevent a “tragedy of the commons” phenomenon in which individual
farmers increased production at the expense of market balance, the
effect was to reduce the degree to which farmers considered the risk of
drought.
Finally, Congress established a new program of agricultural
insurance, through which the government assumed risks that the private
insurance market deemed imprudent.279 The program was administered
by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC),280 and it authorized
the FCIC to insure wheat producers281 “against loss in yields of wheat
due to unavoidable causes, including drought . . . [and other]
unavoidable causes . . . .”282 Because of federal capitalization and the
lack of private shareholders, federal crop insurance conferred subsidies,
as compared to the private market, if private crop insurance was
available at all. Moreover, because the law did not define “drought,”
payments were not limited to extreme conditions, leaving the magnitude
of the subsidy to FCIC discretion. However, the program required
farmers to base planting decisions on drought risk in some respects. The
Act prohibited coverage of “losses due to the neglect or malfeasance of
the producer or to the failure of the producer to reseed in areas and
under circumstances where it is customary to reseed.”283 Insurance was
limited to between 50% and 75% of the average yield of wheat on the
farm for a representative base period, leaving between a quarter and half
of the crop either uninsured or to the private insurance market.284
Finally, the statute required premiums to be “fair and just”285 and
mandated that the corporation’s capital stock could only be restored
“out of operating profits of the Corporation.”286 Presumably, then,
premiums had to suffice to meet expected payout obligations.
Compassion was one justification for New Deal intervention into
U.S. agricultural markets. Congress reallocated risk to society at large
277. See id. § 301(b)(13).
278. See id. § 301(b)(14).
279. See id. § 508.
280. See id. § 503.
281. Congress initially limited federal crop insurance to wheat because of widespread
failures of that crop during the droughts of the 1930s, see id. § 502, but later added other
commodities.
282. Id. § 508(a).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. § 508(b).
286. Id. § 504(a).
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from those whose livelihoods were disrupted by factors perceived to be
beyond their control (such as drought). That rationale, of course, was
the premise for broader social support mechanisms adopted in the
United States during the 1930s.287
Several related economic rationales, however, also justified drought
relief and other New Deal agricultural policies. When large numbers of
farms or other businesses fail or decline in profitability due to drought
or other unpredictable causes, secondary economic impacts to
surrounding communities can be significant.288 Drought relief
rehabilitated regional economies, not only individual farmers.
Moreover, to the extent that farmers produce basic life-support
products, they assume the risk of drought on behalf of society. Although
all businesses incur risks, society arguably has a greater interest in
ensuring the continued supply of food and other life-support products.
Moreover, businesses that face climate uncertainties incur significant
risk beyond what is typical for many other businesses. A laissez-faire
approach requires farmers to internalize that risk just like any other
business. But weather and climate risk may be less amenable to
prediction than other forms of business risk, and that uncertainty will
only increase due to climate disruption. In addition, the federal
government intervened in agricultural markets because producers were
not responding effectively to imbalances between supply and demand.
Even in the face of declining demand and prices, individual farmers
maintained or expanded production to augment earnings and to meet
debt obligations.289 Overproduction not only exacerbated the economic
crisis by flooding the market when prices were already low, but it also
damaged soil, water, and other resources, thus increasing vulnerability
to drought.
Viewed solely from the perspective of drought policy, the New Deal
programs sent mixed messages to farmers. By abandoning the laissezfaire approach, the new policies injected significant distortion into the
agricultural economy in ways that reduced incentives to avoid farming
in drought-prone regions, or to do so in sustainable ways,290 thus

287. See BRANDS, supra note 233, at 297–98 (discussing federal measures during the
opening days of Roosevelt Administration to alleviate the human consequences of bank failures,
as an alternative to free market approach); Opie, supra note 11, at 250 (discussing the New
Deal’s efforts to quell the economic damage suffered by the farmers of the 1930s).
288. During the Dust Bowl, drought impacts extended far beyond the boundaries of the
farm to the entire banking, real estate, and financial infrastructure of affected regions. See supra
Subsection I.C.1.
289. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 167, 179, 181 (observing that farmers planted in the
hope of better conditions).
290. Such practices might include planting drought-resistant crops or crop varieties,
cultivating only in productive soils, using water-efficient tilling and irrigation methods,
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increasing long-term drought vulnerability. To the extent that New Deal
policies relied on loans that required repayment in cash or commodities,
crop insurance that required payment of premiums, and conservation
payments tied to planting allotments and quotas, the programs required
farmers to internalize some of the risk of drought. On the other hand,
producers’ risk decisions were distorted by guarantees such as direct
parity payments, subsidies through below-market crop insurance rates,
loan liability limited to the value of the crops as collateral, and the
adjustment of production levels to account for drought and other losses.
Two factors might have caused Congress to abandon price supports
and production controls as the Great Depression ended. Demand for
agricultural commodities skyrocketed during World War II due to
production declines in the war zones, and the 1930s droughts gave way
to favorable weather during the 1940s.291 However, to encourage high
wartime production and ensure that farmers shared in profits generated
by the war, Congress actually increased loan rates and price supports
during the war, as well as the number of commodities covered.292
Although wartime programs did not alter U.S. drought and agricultural
policy, they hinted that temporary programs adopted to address the
drought and depression would give way to the permanent decoupling of
U.S. agriculture from free market forces.
c. Postwar Drought and Agricultural Policy
U.S. drought and agricultural policies during the Cold War
continued to send mixed signals about the degree to which farmers
should internalize drought risk into production decisions. Despite the
end of the market crisis and volatility generated by the Great Depression
(crop surpluses) and World War II (crop shortages), Congress did not
withdraw from wide-scale federal intervention into agricultural markets.
However, with respect to drought relief specifically, the postwar period
reflected a tension between the return to the free market approach
during the Eisenhower Administration and the growing interest in
public disaster preparedness as an overall Cold War strategy.
Beginning in the 1950s, many aspects of federal drought policy were
tied to legislation governing other disaster relief.293 This trend began in
1950 with Public Law 81-875,294 which created the familiar process
fallowing acreage during the worst droughts, and diversifying the farm economy rather than
relying exclusively on monocultures of commodity crops.
291. See Opie, supra note 11, at 251; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 267–76.
292. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra
note 237, at 16–17.
293. See DYSON, supra note 233, at 3.
294. Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109 (1950). Dyson asserts that Congress passed this
law, in part, in response to the Cold War threat of nuclear attack. DYSON, supra note 233, at 3.
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under which state governors may request, and presidents may declare,
disasters295 “of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster
assistance by the Federal Government to supplement” state and local
efforts and resources.296 Because the law provided no additional
guidance on the nature, severity, geographic extent, or duration of
disasters sufficient to warrant an emergency declaration, the law
conferred tremendous discretion on the President to decide “how bad is
bad enough” to justify federal disaster assistance.297
Public Law 81-875 did not provide financial payments or other
monetary relief, but authorized the federal government to provide
equipment, supplies, personnel, distribution of food and medicine; and
to protect lives and property, make emergency repairs, and temporarily
replace public facilities.298 However, in later disaster relief statutes,
Congress authorized loans and other financial relief for areas in which
the President issued a disaster declaration.299 Although these measures
constituted a subsidy to the extent that they provided credit not available
on the private market,300 they did so only through loans rather than
outright grants or relief payments, and with a provision specifically
designed to limit assistance to operations that remained viable. This
pattern continued in subsequent targeted drought and disaster relief bills
through the 1970s,301 including the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (the
However, the legislative history indicates that the law was designed to provide a framework for
federal assistance during “a major peacetime disaster.” See S. REP. NO. 2571 (1950), reprinted
in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4023, 4024.
295. The statute’s definition of “major disaster” includes drought as well as other weatherrelated disasters. See Pub L. No. 81-875, § 2(a), 64 Stat. 1109, 1109–10.
296. Id.
297. Id. § 5.
298. Id. § 3.
299. E.g., Pub. L. No. 83-115, 67 Stat. 149, 149–50 (1953) (authorizing “loans to
established farmers and stockmen”). In response to protracted drought in the south-central
states, Congress authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to make temporary loans to farmers and
stockmen in areas covered by presidential declarations of disasters, and for which commercial
credit was not available. See H.R. REP. NO. 714 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1867,
1868–69. Congress limited loans, however, to operators who had “a reasonable chance of
working out of their difficulties with supplementary financing,” and for feed and seed in
connection with any disaster determination. Id. at 1867–68.
300. See H.R. REP. NO. 714, at 1870–71 (citing concerns when cattle price declines
increase risk of loan defaults).
301. See, e.g., Disaster Relief Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-769, § 3, 80 Stat. 1316, 1316
(1966) (authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to adjust federal loans in areas affected by disaster
declarations under Public Law 81-875); Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606,
§§ 231–32, 84 Stat. 1744, 1752–53 (1970) (authorizing disaster loans to small business and
farmers and the cancelation or modification of loans); Emergency Livestock Credit Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-357, §§ 2(a), 3(a)–(c), 88 Stat. 391, 391–92 (1974) (authorizing federal loan
guarantees to “bona fide farmers and ranchers who are primarily and directly engaged in
agricultural production” to support livestock operations where commercial credit is not
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Stafford Act),302 which comprehensively revised and broadened the
scope of federal relief for all kinds of disasters, including drought.303
Furthermore, the Act retained but modified the basic format of
gubernatorial request and presidential declaration of disaster
emergencies and major disasters.304
Similarly, federal agricultural policy continued to provide both
incentives and disincentives to reducing drought vulnerability.
Immediately after World War II, ongoing federal intervention into the
agricultural economy was hardly a foregone conclusion. Just as
Congress intended that the New Deal agricultural program would expire
when the economic emergency subsided, it provided that wartime
agricultural subsidy programs would terminate two years after the end
of hostilities.305 When the time of reckoning arrived, however, Congress
determined that the absence of the wartime stimulus not only supported
continuation of the program, but did so with even higher levels of
subsidies.306 With the Agricultural Act of 1949,307 Congress reaffirmed
the dual goals of production controls and parity prices. Despite ongoing
structural changes in U.S. agriculture from a large number of small
farms to an increasing concentration of farms and products,308 the
postwar decision to continue price supports and production controls
occurred without a fundamental reconsideration of whether the
agricultural sector could now self-regulate production in response to
prices better than it had during previous eras.
If anything, federal agricultural programs expanded in the postwar
era. The 1949 Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to continue
agricultural price supports via loans, purchases, or other methods, with
available, where additional financing is “absolutely essential in order for the loan applicant to
remain in business,” and where there is a “reasonable probability” of meeting the Act’s
objectives and of loan repayment).
302. Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
303. The definitions of both “emergency” and “major disaster” include drought. A “major
disaster” declaration authorizes the President to provide assistance beyond emergency services.
Id. § 102(1)–(2).
304. See id. § 301.
305. See S. REP. NO. 81-1130 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2407, 2408.
306. “[I]t is imperative that the program be placed on a permanent, peacetime basis
beginning in 1950 principally because the extraordinary demands for American agricultural
production during the war period have largely ceased to exist.” Id. With respect to subsidy
levels, the Report also noted “the range of support levels from 52 to 75 percent of parity for the
basic commodities contained in that act is much too low for effective use now.” Id.
307. Pub. L. No. 81-439, 63 Stat. 1051 (1949).
308. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra
note 237, at 46; CAROLYN DIMITRI, ANNE EFFLAND, & NEILSON CONKLIN, U.S. DEPT.
AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, ECON. INFO. BULL. NO. 3, THE 20TH CENTURY
TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY 2, 5 fig.3 (2005).
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strong preferences to producers who cooperate with established, cropspecific marketing quotas, but with even higher minimum and
maximum levels of support relative to the parity price.309 Moreover, in
addition to “basic agricultural commodities,”310 the 1949 Act added
specified “nonbasic agricultural commodities” at different support
levels.311 Otherwise, Congress largely reaffirmed the basic precepts of
the existing statutes.312
The Cold War also increased incentives to expand international
markets in friendly nations at the expense of Communist countries. In
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,313
Congress authorized the President to negotiate agreements with
“friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations”314 to sell “surplus
agricultural commodities [in return] for foreign currencies,”315 and to
use those currencies to further develop agricultural markets, among
other purposes.316 Although motivated mainly by foreign policy,317 this
309. Agricultural Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-439, § 101, 63 Stat. 1051, 1051 (1949).
Within legislatively mandated ranges of price supports, the Secretary was given discretion to
establish support levels based on a series of factors, including: (1) the relationship between
supply and demand; (2) price supports for other commodities; (3) funding levels; (4) the
perishable nature of each commodity; (5) the importance of each commodity to agriculture and
the national economy; (6) marketability of stocks collected by the government; (7) needs to
offset export losses; and (8) producer willingness to control supplies relative to demand. Id.
§ 401(b).
310. These now included corn, cotton, peanuts, rice, tobacco, and wheat. See id. § 408(c)
(adding peanuts to the five commodities included in the 1938 Act).
311. These included wool, tung nuts, honey, Irish potatoes, milk, butterfat, and milk and
butterfat products, at different specified prices. See id. §§ 201, 301–02.
312. See, e.g., id. § 401(c) (authorizing Secretary to condition assistance on compliance
with production goals and marketing quotas); id. § 402 (authorizing increased support when
necessary to assure adequate supplies for purposes of national welfare or national security); id.
§ 405 (limiting producer liability to the value of the crops used as collateral to secure loans); id.
§ 408(h) (allowing Secretary to modify the calculation of “normal supply” due to “abnormal
conditions”). High, fixed-price supports continued during the Korean War, again to stimulate
wartime production. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT
PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 20–21.
313. Pub. L. No. 83-480, 68 Stat. 454 (1954).
314. The Act defined “friendly nation” to mean “any country other than (1) the U.S.S.R., or
(2) any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist movement.” Id. § 107.
315. Id. §§ 101–02.
316. Id. § 104.
317. See id. § 201 (authorizing the President to use surplus agricultural commodities to
meet “famine or other urgent relief requirements” to “friendly peoples” or to “friendly but needy
populations without regard to the friendliness of their government”); id. § 304 (directing the
President “(1) to assist friendly nations to be independent of trade with the U.S.S.R. or nations
dominated or controlled by the U.S.S.R. for food, raw materials and markets, and (2) to assure
that agricultural commodities sold or transferred [under the Act] do not result in increased
availability of those or like commodities to unfriendly nations”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1776
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strategy continued to shift the focus from curtailing agricultural
production to encouraging domestic surpluses for international trade.318
Nevertheless, Congress continued price supports and production
controls for commodity crops, but with fine-tuning through periodic
“farm bills,” typically in five-year intervals, which reauthorized but
modified the commodity-specific “permanent provisions” of earlier
law.319 Congress continued to assert that federal price supports and
production controls were essential to the national economy and that
without them, increased productivity per acre would outstrip demand,
causing prices to plummet, agricultural markets to collapse, and farms
to fail. 320 Therefore, farm legislation during this period tried to balance
the goal of matching supply and demand to maintain stable prices with
the goal of expanding export markets. In the 1970 farm bill, for
example, Congress maintained but specified price supports and planting
limitations established in earlier law321 and extended the export
development policy.322 Federal crop subsidies continued to offset
farming risk so long as producers planted the specified amount of
acreage, which was fixed based on past planting patterns rather than
current conditions.323
Thus, despite the return to economic prosperity and more
(1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2509, 2509 (noting that the main purpose of legislation
was “to authorize the President to use agricultural commodities to improve the foreign
relations”). This was not the first time agricultural price supports were used in foreign policy.
During World War II, price supports supported the war effort by providing food and fiber to the
United States and its allies. See S. REP. NO. 1130, supra note 304, at 2407–08.
318. H.R. REP. NO. 1776, supra note 316, at 2510 (“Thus, our farm productive capacity
now is running in excess of current market demands. A major factor has been the reduction in
exports from the postwar peak . . . . Our goal in the trade section of this legislation is to reverse
this trend of restricted exports by expanding world outlets.”).
319. See Agriculture Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, 84 Stat. 1358; Food and Agriculture
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-321, 79 Stat. 1187; Agricultural Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-128,
75 Stat. 294; Agricultural Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-540, 70 Stat. 188.
320. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 687 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3957, 3959–60
(“Action . . . to extend and augment farm commodity programs is imperative. The entire
economy as well as the farm segment will benefit from such action and would suffer for lack of
it.”).
321. Agriculture Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, §§ 401–02, 84 Stat. 1358, 1362
(amending the Agriculture Act of 1949 with respect to wheat); id. § 501 (same, with respect to
feed grains); id. §§ 601–02 (same, with respect to cotton).
322. See id. § 701.
323. See, e.g., id. § 402 (amending section 379c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 to exempt wheat allotment acreage not planted due to disasters or other conditions beyond
producer control). The Secretary was again instructed to exclude from calculations of allotments
acreage not planted due to drought and other “natural disaster” or “condition beyond the control
of the producer,” see, e.g., id. (amending sections 379b and 379c of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938), further minimizing the relevance of such risk factors in producer planting
decisions. The 1970 law, however, limited total crop subsidies under the Act to $55,000 per
person. Id. § 101(1).
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conservative leadership after World War II, Cold War disaster-planning
mentality, foreign policy motivations, and farmers’ expectations of
ongoing government support led Congress to perpetuate the price
supports and production controls begun during the New Deal. These
factors also led to a patchwork of federal disaster relief efforts relating
to droughts. Drought relief continued to focus on loans, ensuring that
producers continued to bear some risk of bad weather, and thus had
some incentive to take drought risk into account in planting decisions.
However, federal commodity programs likely overwhelmed incentives
in loan-based disaster relief efforts in terms of their effect on producer
planting decisions. Virtually guaranteed income, on top of additional
subsidies provided by crop insurance and disaster loans, significantly
reduced the need for farmers to incorporate the risk of loss into
production decisions. Moreover, farm bill programs encouraged farmers
to plant commodity crops at the expense of a more diverse and more
drought-tolerant mix of crops.
d. The “Free Market” Evolution of U.S. Agricultural Law and Policy
U.S. agricultural laws and policies morphed during the 1970s and
1980s in ways that increased incentives for overproduction and
unsustainable farming practices,324 including expanded production in
regions that face increased water scarcity. Those policies, boosted by
massive federal subsidies to flood the world market with cheap
commodity crops, now encourage U.S. farmers to expand production of
commodity crops, even during times of plummeting global commodity
prices and significant resulting reductions in net farm income.325 In the
long run, absent a shift to more sustainable practices, those incentives
could render farmers in the Great Plains and other regions more
vulnerable to drought, whether induced by climate disruption or
otherwise, just as they were in the late 1920s and early 1930s.326
324. See Jennifer Hoffpauir, The Environmental Impact of Commodity Subsidies: NEPA
and the Farm Bill, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 234, 244–56 (2009) (evaluating adverse
environmental impacts of farm subsidies); Kwan, supra note 99, at 571–72 (referring to 1973
changes as a “fundamental transition, shifting . . . from a loan-based system of controlling prices
to a payment-based system emphasizing production”); Davidson, supra note 100 (discussing the
detrimental farming policies creating during the 1980s); Angelo, supra note 100 (discussing
current problematic agricultural practices, as well as the laws which seem to incentivize those
practices).
325. See DENNIS KEENEY & LONI KEMP, A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED
STATES 7–11 (2003); DARYLL E. RAY ET AL., RETHINKING U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY:
CHANGING COURSE TO SECURE FARMER LIVELIHOODS WORLDWIDE 9–14 (2003); Eubanks, supra
note 76, at 10,496–97.
326. Those policies simultaneously increase vulnerability of farmers in developing
countries, who cannot compete with the flood of cheap commodities from the United States and
Europe. See RAY ET AL., supra note 325, at 11, 13.
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Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz promoted the first and most
dramatic shift in U.S. agricultural law and policy during the early
1970s. Butz advocated for consolidating small farms into larger
agribusinesses and planting available farmland “from fencerow to
fencerow” in order to lower food prices and to further expand U.S.
export markets.327 Those arguments persuaded Congress to change the
focus of U.S. farm policy in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection
Act of 1973.328 Although the 1973 Act and later farm bills established a
phenomenally complex, interwoven set of programs based on a
combination of economic tools, it minimized the role of parity price
supports329 in favor of a new program of target prices and deficiency
payments. This new program was designed to ensure certain levels of
revenue for major commodity producers, with guaranteed adjustments
for drought and other disasters.330 From the 1930s through the 1960s,
Congress approved significant federal subsidies,331 but nevertheless
forced farmers to internalize at least some of the risks of planting
decisions. The virtually guaranteed price subsidies in the 1973 Act
further reduced incentives for planters to account for drought risk in
deciding what to plant and when. Ironically, although the program was
sold as a “free market” approach to agricultural policy because it
allowed prices to fluctuate based on actual market supply and demand
rather than government dictates,332 it functions as anything but a free
market from the perspective of the government’s increased
subsidization of U.S agriculture.
Although others have traced the complicated history of subsequent
farm bills,333 Congress has retained the direct payment approach to farm
subsidies, combined with a new set of loan provisions that further
reduce farmer planting risk regardless of weather or market
conditions.334 For several farm bill cycles, Congress retained the dual
system of loans plus deficiency payments, with crop-specific finetuning based on market conditions and political pressures.335 In the
327. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 580.
328. Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221 (1973); see id. § 815(d) (directing Secretary of
Agriculture to encourage U.S. farmers to maximize production); HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL
PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 29–31 (discussing the Act and
its effects).
329. See § 101(1), 87 Stat. at 221 (lowering price support limit to $20,000).
330. See, e.g., id. § 206(8)(A) (amending Act to provide for wheat deficiency payments,
with disaster adjustments).
331. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra
note 237, at iv–v (summarizing the major agricultural legislation).
332. Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221 (1973).
333. See Angelo, supra note 100, at 623–29; Kwan, supra note 99, at 572, 580–87.
334. See Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 245.
335. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra
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Food Security Act of 1985,336 Congress added “[m]arketing loans”337
that allow farmers to store commodities when prices are low and to
repay the loans when the market improves.338 In the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIRA),339 Congress replaced
target prices and deficiency payments with “production flexibility
contracts” in which farmers received guaranteed direct payments tied to
their contract acreage. Congress later augmented FAIRA with additional
emergency payments when market conditions failed to improve.340 In
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002,341 Congress added
“counter-cyclical” payments when commodity prices fell below
statutory targets based on historical averages.342
All of these changes since 1973 could reduce drought vulnerability
in some ways while increasing it in others. Direct payments, marketing
loans, and countercyclical payments offset the risk farmers take in
meeting society’s need for food and fiber, thus meeting Congress’ longterm goal of stabilizing farm income while ensuring a sufficient and
reasonably priced food supply. Moreover, by basing direct payments on
historical acreage rather than actual production, Congress gave farmers
the flexibility to fallow lands under poor conditions and to still receive
some income for that acreage.343 On the other hand, those guarantees
have encouraged overproduction of statutory commodity crops.344
Among other social, economic, and environmental problems caused by
those incentives,345 agricultural subsidies promote crop selection based
on subsidies rather than climatic or other environmental factors, and
planting decisions based on guaranteed payments rather than water
supply and soil conditions.
Federal production limits and land conservation programs begun in
the 1938 Soil Conservation Act provide counterincentives, through
voluntary programs to protect sensitive acreage and curtail production.
Those included the “Soil Bank” program established temporarily in
note 237, at 32, 37 (describing both the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 and the Agriculture
and Food Act of 1981).
336. Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
337. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 582 (“Marketing loans first came into effect with the
Food Secuirty Act of 1985.”).
338. See id. §§ 308, 501, 601 (detailing this process for wheat, cotton, and rice,
respectively); Kwan, supra note 99, at 582. Congress continued that program in the 1996 law.
See id.
339. Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (1996).
340. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 581–82.
341. Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).
342. See Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 238–39; Kwan, supra note 99, at 583–84.
343. See Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 238.
344. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 585.
345. See id. at 586 & n.112; Angelo, supra note 100, at 602–13.
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1956346 and a wide range of more recent programs347 for which
Congress has increased funding in recent decades.348 Those programs
could serve as tools for federal drought prevention policy by
conditioning subsidies on sustainable water use. However, agricultural
conservation provisions have received mixed reviews in terms of their
effectiveness in protecting the environment.349 Ultimately, the question
is whether incentives to reduce drought vulnerability through
conservation programs can override stronger incentives to continue
excess production of commodity crops, given the vastly higher funding
levels Congress has devoted to those programs350 and ongoing efforts to
expand U.S. agricultural export markets. Moreover, none of the existing
conservation programs focus primarily on water use.
e. Ongoing Problems in Federal Agricultural and Drought Policy
From the perspective of reducing drought vulnerability, not much
has changed in federal agricultural or drought law and policy since the
1970s. Congress largely continued the “free market” policies begun in
1973 in the most recent farm bill, the Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act of 2008.351 New incentives to grow corn for biofuels reinforce those
free market policies.352
To the extent that Congress has adopted drought-specific legislation,
it has fallen prey to the “hydro-illogical cycle”353 and has tended to do
so on an ad hoc basis in response to individual droughts, with the
response proportional to the pressure from constituents for relief.354
346. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra
note 237, at 22.
347. See Angelo, supra note 100, at 629–32 (discussing various modern programs,
including the 2008 Farm Bill, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, and the
Agricultural Management Assistance Program).
348. See id.; Davidson, supra note 100, at 5, 36 (noting increased funding for conservation
programs in 2002 farm bill).
349. See Angelo, supra note 100, at 632 (arguing that agricultural conservation programs
fail to “address the overarching environmental concerns associated with industrial commodity
production”); Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 245–46 (explaining problems with Conservation
Reserve Program and reporting significant declines in enrolled CRP acreage between 2007 and
2010, and significant conversion of grassland to cropland).
350. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 100, at 37 (estimating in 2003 that only 18% of farm
bill payments support conservation); Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 236, 246 (reporting that, out
of $92.9 billion in farm support under the 2002 Farm Bill, the vast majority ($72.9 billion) was
for commodity support programs (citing RALPH M. CHITE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FARM
BILL BUDGET AND COSTS: 2002 VS. 2007, at 2 (2007), available at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/18788.pdf)).
351. Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008); see also Angelo, supra note 100, at 625.
352. See Angelo, supra note 100, at 633–37.
353. DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23, at 54.
354. See NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at
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Drought management experts and government agencies and
commissions have continued to criticize this practice as producing relief
measures that are ineffective, poorly coordinated, and short-term and
reactive in focus.355 An ad hoc, emergency-oriented legislative practice
also distorts whatever risk allocation principles and incentives for
sustainability may be included in state or federal water law. When
legislatures pass drought relief solely in response to individual crises, it
is too late to adopt policies to require or encourage water users to
engage in sound risk management and more sustainable practices.
Especially given political pressure to help desperate constituents,
emergency legislation inevitably focuses almost entirely on providing
compassionate physical and financial relief.
Comprehensive federal drought legislation was proposed in
Congress in 2003356 in response to findings of the National Drought
Policy Commission,357 but has not been enacted to date. Congress has,
however, adopted discrete provisions that move in the direction of a
more coherent federal drought policy.358 Legislation adopted
independently of any particular drought could focus on risk reduction
by promoting sustainable water use and management in advance of a
crisis, in addition to addressing drought planning, forecasting,
communication, and coordination. Such proactive legislation could also
expressly condition drought relief on the adoption of responsible riskreduction measures. An anticipatory approach is more objective because
it separates long-term policy decisions from impacts to particular
constituents. Of course, the necessary corollary would be subsequent
legislative discipline—that is, Congress would need to avoid the
inclination to bail out those who fail to respond to the incentives in the
omnibus legislation.

26 tbl.III (identifying major federal and state legislation passed during the late 1980s drought).
See generally DYSON, supra note 230 (providing history of federal drought relief legislation).
355. See, e.g., PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23; FEDERAL
EFFORTS TO MONITOR AND COORDINATE RESPONSES TO DROUGHT, supra note 82.
356. S. 1454, 108th Cong. (2003).
357. PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23, at 35.
358. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 313d (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to
establish a National Integrated Drought Information System to collect and synthesize data to
provide and communicate early drought warnings); 33 U.S.C. § 2267a (2006) (authorizing
Secretary of the Army to assess drought and other water resource needs, and to prioritize federal
projects, on a river basin or watershed basis); 42 U.S.C. § 5131 (2006) (authorizing the
President to create a federal disaster preparedness plan, and to assist states, through grants and
otherwise, in developing and implementing state disaster preparation plans); 42 U.S.C. § 10367
(2006) (establishing National Streamflow Information Program within U.S. Geological Survey,
including goal of better understanding hydrologic extremes like droughts); 43 U.S.C. §§ 2215,
2222–23 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to work with state, federal, and local
officials to create drought contingency plans in Reclamation Act states).
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The ability of federal drought relief programs to reduce vulnerability
has also been plagued by the same absence of consistent definitions
characteristic of other areas of water and drought law. In response to
serious droughts during the mid-1970s, for example, a federal
interagency committee designated counties eligible for federal relief
absent any clear legal standard or guidance.359 Presumably in the face of
political pressure, two-thirds of the Nation’s counties were designated
drought disaster areas, making them eligible for federal relief.360 That
unguided approach likely resulted in undeserving aid recipients and
spread resources so thinly that others may not have received necessary
aid.
During the 1970s, federal agencies also applied differing drought
definitions to identify eligible aid recipients.361 Although varying
criteria may be appropriate for different relief, critics suggested that
those differences were more ad hoc than well-considered.362 Federal
agencies continue to use different criteria for determining eligibility for
drought relief or assistance.363 On the other hand, there has been a move
to systematize and coordinate dissemination of drought information
through projects such as the U.S. Drought Monitor,364 the North
American Drought Monitor,365 and the Seasonal Drought Outlook.366
Although these efforts do not provide legally binding drought
definitions, they help create common standards and nomenclature for
understanding and communicating drought information.
359. See MANAGING RESOURCE SCARCITY, supra note 122, at 20–22.
360. See id.; FEDERAL EFFORTS TO MONITOR AND COORDINATE RESPONSES TO DROUGHT,
supra note 82, at 2; COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE 1976–77
DROUGHT: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE NEXT? 2 (1979) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE
1976–77 DROUGHT].
361. See FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE 1976–77 DROUGHT, supra note 360, at 17.
362. See id.
363. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1531(d)(1)(B) (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to
establish drought monitor to classify drought severity); 19 U.S.C. § 2497(d)(1)(B) (2006)
(establishing drought monitor system to classify drought severity for customs purposes); 43
U.S.C. § 2214 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to determine eligibility for
drought assistance from Bureau of Reclamation under § 2213).
364. See U.S. DROUGHT MONITOR, http://drought.unl.edu/dm (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
This tool is designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of drought conditions across the
country at particular points in time. See MICHAEL J. HAYES ET AL., Drought Monitoring: New
Tools for the 21st Century, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23, at 53, 54, 58.
365. See N. Am. Drought Monitor, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., North American
Drought Monitor Overview, NOAA, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/monitoring/
drought/nadm/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) (describing the Monitor’s success rate at “assessing
and communicating the state of drought in the US [sic] on a weekly basis”).
366. See Nat’l Weather Serv. Climate Prediction Ctr., U.S. Seasonal Drought Outlook,
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/expert_assessment/
seasonal_drought.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) (providing seasonal drought assessments).
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CONCLUSION: BALANCING COMPASSION AND RISK IN A DISRUPTED
CLIMATE
In a disrupted climate, agriculture and certain other economic sectors
will be forced to undertake increased risks caused by other economic
activities. Although agriculture contributes to climate disruption,367 it is
arguably inequitable to require one economic sector to internalize a
disproportionate share of external costs of global problems generated by
many others. This inequity is particularly true for an economic sector
like agriculture, which provides many of society’s basic necessities.
Whether induced by compassion, politics, or other factors, efforts are
(and will be) made to compensate those who bear an unfair burden on
behalf of society at large. However, measures to spread the risk of
climate disruption could have the negative effect of increasing
vulnerability by subsidizing activities that will eventually increase
drought and other risks. In this regard, drought and other disaster
response policies that might be appropriate for occasional and difficultto-foresee events may no longer be appropriate for conditions that will
now occur with increasing frequency due to climate disruption.
One role of law is to allocate risk fairly and in a way that achieves
sound public policy goals. A second role of law is to promote or require
behavioral changes deemed beneficial to the community. These
functions of law suggest that climate adaptation strategies should reflect
a considered judgment about the appropriate balance between
compensating victims of climate disruption and reducing long-term
vulnerability. In the case of climate-induced changes in drought
frequency, severity, and geographic scope, identifying this balance will
require a serious rethinking of drought law and policy and of more
fundamental aspects of water and agricultural law and policy, as well.
In establishing programs to provide drought relief, the definition of
drought should be based on consistent policy decisions about how the
risk of water shortages should be distributed. Declaring drought (and
providing relief) too readily can discourage prevention and risk
reduction, while declaring drought too late can result in significant
hardship and secondary impacts. Thus, any comprehensive federal
drought legislation should identify consistent principles governing when
federal drought relief or other responses should be triggered.368
Moreover, drought relief can be effectively balanced against risk
reduction goals by providing relief only to those who take appropriate
367. See KEITH PAUSTIAN ET AL., AGRICULTURE’S ROLE IN GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION
passim (2006); Angelo, supra note 100, at 612–13.
368. Given the complexity of drought monitoring and definitions, it is probably necessary
to delegate the task of adopting specific numeric drought criteria to administrative agencies.
Moreover, regional variation may be necessary to reflect the diversity of climatic, hydrological,
and other conditions in the United States.
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measures to reduce vulnerability, such as switching to low water
demand crops in drought-prone regions or improving irrigation or other
water-use efficiency.
However, those improvements alone, although extremely important,
may be too narrow to address the increasing frequency and severity of
drought that may accompany climate disruption. Underlying patterns of
human land and water use will increase water demand and thus
exacerbate the effects of reduced water supply.369 The impact of use
patterns on water supply suggests a need for broader changes in the
laws and policies affecting the places, purposes, and efficiencies of
water use. Although water law has long been criticized for protecting
existing uses at the expense of efficiency and shifting societal needs and
preferences,370 changes that increase incentives to use water more
sustainably and to eliminate impediments to water transfers will become
even more important. Moreover, it may be preferable to adopt droughtneutral approaches to water law, or to condition any changes to water
rights during drought on prior efforts to reduce drought vulnerability.
Providing relief from the regular requirements of water law in the case
of drought may protect existing uses in times of shortage, but it does so
at the expense of long-term vulnerability.
Finally, although agriculture is just one of the many economic
sectors in which water use efficiency is important to drought
vulnerability and severity, it is the area of federal law that has
historically been most closely associated with federal drought policy
and response. In many parts of the United States, agriculture is the
largest consumptive water user, and yet it is also the user most likely to
be adversely affected by drought. Therefore, broader changes in
agricultural law and policy are necessary to reduce drought vulnerability
in the face of climate disruption. Rather than continuing to promote
excess production of a predetermined set of commodity crops
irrespective of climatic and other conditions, federal agricultural law
should promote production of the most appropriate crops based on
water supply, temperature, and other conditions in particular regions in
the face of climate disruption. If federal agricultural law and policy,
along with its massive historic subsidies, continues to serve as the
primary factor motivating economic decisions about what crops to plant
and where, changes to water and drought law and policy will play, at
best, only a limited role in reducing drought vulnerability.
369. See Donald A. Wilhite & Margie Buchanan-Smith, Drought as Hazard:
Understanding the Natural and Social Context, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23,
at 10 (discussing “human-induced drought” where demand exceeds supply even during times of
normal precipitation); COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY, supra note 7, at 8–10 (distinguishing
between natural conditions leading to drought and human-induced water shortages).
370. See Wilkinson, supra note 95.
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U.S. water, drought, and agricultural law provide just one example
of the need to balance compassion and risk in climate adaptation
policies. The same basic lesson may be appropriate to economic sectors
affected by other impacts of climate disruption. Examples include real
estate developers facing risks from sea level rise and electric power
suppliers facing higher demand as temperatures rise. The compassionate
or political impulse may be to provide subsidies or other financial relief
from those impacts. But in addition to becoming increasingly and
perhaps impossibly expensive, those responses may only perpetuate the
very activities that increase long-term vulnerability to climate change.
Rather than adopting climate adaptation policies through after-the-fact,
band-aid solutions, the most effective responses should consider the
basic economic drivers of activities that increase vulnerability to climate
disruption.
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